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ABSTRACT
In Rust v. Reid,' a 1918 case involving testamentary capacity, the Supreme Court of Virginia wrote the "cases upon this subject are almost without number, and they are not to be
reconciled," 2 but Rust referred to "all of the decisions of this court on the subject of competency of jurors," 3 which also had been at issue in the case. However, in its decision in Rust,
the Court easily could have leveled the same self-criticism about its cases deciding (1) which
party bears the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation; (2) whether a presumption of testamentary capacity exists; and (3) whether the jury is instructed about that presumption. Today, after a series of three cases decided in the last four years, 4 t1ose cases remain irreconcilable.

The burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation has been "reversed" at least eleven times in the history of Commonwealth. However, those "reversals" occurred only in the
colloquial, and not the legal, sense. The Supreme Court of Virginia has never expressly reversed any of its decisions, nor, with one exception in 1908,s has the court even admitted
that a conflict exists. Kiddell v. Labowitz6 (2012), the most recent case, discovered a jury
instruction from Huff v. Welch' (1913), which had not been the subject of an appellate opinion for over sixty years, yet about which, according to Kiddell, "[flor the next hundred years,
the Court [had] addressed and approved the exact same instruction or a close variant."8 Under the Kiddell instructions (which make an important and inadequately explained change to
the Huff instruction), even though the proponent of a will ostensibly bears the burden to
prove testamentary capacity, the will's opponent must present "[e]vidence that is sufficient
to satisfy an unprejudiced mind seeking the truth" 9 "o overcome the presumption of testamentary capacity."

0

Contrary to the express statement in Kiddell about a hundred-year consistency between
Huff (1913) and Kiddell (2012), during that almost one hundred years fourteen cases flatly
inconsistent with Huff were decided, including (1) three cases that placed the burden of proof
upon the proponents without mention of the presumption at all, 1 (2) seven cases that placed

' Rust v. Reid, 97 S.E. 324 (Va. 1918).
Id. at 328 (quoting McCue v. Commonwealth, 49 S.E. 623, 625 (Va. 1905)).
3
id.
4 Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622 (Va. 2012); Weedon v. Weedon, 720 S.E.2d 552 (Va. 2012); Parish v. Parish, 704 S.E.2d 99 (Va. 2011).
Hopkins v. Wampler, 62 S.E. 926, 927 (Va. 1908).
6 Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 629.
Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573, 575 (Va. 1913).
Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 629 (citing Huff, 78 S.E. at 578).
Id. at 627 (defining "evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of testamentary capacity" as
"satisfactory evidence" and defining "satisfactory evidence" as "[e]vidence that is sufficient to satisfy an
unprejudiced mind seeking the truth").
'oId. at 627 (quoting Gibbs v. Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499, 501 (Va. 1990)).
The cases are Fields v. Fields, 499 S.E.2d 826 (Va. 1998); Walton v. Walton, 191 S.E. 768 (Va.
2
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the burden of proof upon the proponents, said that the presumption existed, but indicated that
the presumption was of the common variety and not told to the jury, 12 and (3) four cases that
placed the burden of proof upon the opponents, 13 tus obviating any need for an evidentiary
14
presumption in favor of the proponents.

Just before Huff was decided (1913), the Wallens (1907) decision had provided another
"hundred-year" canard. Wallen v. Wallen concluded that the presumption of testamentary
capacity shifted the burden of proof to the opponent and cited Temple v. Temple1 6 (1807) as
"a case decided just one hundred years ago and never since questioned."" Although Wallen
and Temple were consistent, during the one hundred years between them, five cases had
placed the burden on the proponent without benefit of any presumption, and three of them
had required proof by clear and convincing evidence,"

yet Wallen mentioned none of

them.19

Consequently, neither the hundred year consistency claimed by Kiddell (2012) about
Huff s 1913 rule on instructing juries about the presumption of testamentary capacity, nor the
hundred year consistency claimed by Wallen (1907) about Temple's (1807) rule that the opponent bears the burden of proof on testamentary capacity actually existed. Moreover, the
irreconcilable cases did not vanish after those declarations of hundred-year rules. After
Wallen (1907) and Huff (1913), the burden-of-proof and effect-of-presumption cases continued widely to vary the rules without recognition of any inconsistency.

20

This article is both a piece of doctrinal scholarship, describing which party bears the burden in testamentary capacity litigation and whether and how a presumption of testamentary
capacity operates, and a piece of historical analysis, demonstrating two disturbing practices
of the Supreme Court of Virginia within those doctrines: a rather cavalier attitude in not following precedent, and a rather careless method of citing it.

1937); Lester's Ex'rv. Simpkins, 83 S.E. 1062 (Va. 1915). See infra section I.A.3.
12 The cases are Weedon v. Weedon, 720 S.E.2d 552 (Va. 2012); Parish v. Parish,
704 S.E.2d 99 (Va.
2011); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499 (Va. 1990); Croft v. Snidow, 33 S.E.2d 208 (Va. 1945); Hall v.
Hall, 23 S.E.2d 810 (Va. 1943); Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879 (Va. 1936); Dickens v. Bonnewell,
108 S.E. 610 (Va. 1933). See infra section 0.
' The cases are Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151 (Va. 1950); Tabb v. Willis, 156 S.E. 556 (Va. 1931);
Smith v. Ottley, 132 S.E. 512 (Va. 1926); Woody v. Taylor, 77 S.E. 498 (1913). See infra section 0.
14Tate, 57 S.E.2d at 160 (placing the burden initially on the proponent but instructing the jury that the
presumption governed "until the contrary is proved."). Tate was cited by Kiddell as consistent with Huff.
Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 629-30.
' Wallen v. Wallen, 57 S.E. 596, 599 (Va. 1907).
16 Temple v. Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476 (1807).
' Wallen, 57 S.E. at 599.
' The cases are Gray v. Rumrill, 44 S.E. 697 (Va. 1903); Chappell v. Trent, 19 S.E. 314 (Va. 1893);
Tucker v. Sandidge, 8 S.E. 650 (Va. 1888); Riddell v. Johnson's Ex'r, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 152 (1875);
Coalter's Ex'r v. Bryan, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 18 (1844). See infra notes 70 to 75 and accompanying text.
' Wallen, 57 S.E. at 598-99.
20 See infra section I.A.1.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Section Two demonstrates that what Kiddell v. Labowitz2 1 presented as a
firm rule regarding the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation
does not have a historical foundation nearly as firm as the Supreme Court of
Virginia said it did. That historical analysis will show that eleven unannounced reversals in the burden-of-proof rule had been made prior to Kiddell. The problems arising from that serpentine path exist beyond the failure
to satisfy the normal demand for consistency in common law. Rather, that
discussion will show that when the Supreme Court of Virginia reverses the
burden of proof, the Court does not acknowledge the conflict with prior decisions, much less discuss, analyze, or resolve the matter.
Section Three considers the Kiddell (2012) decision, and its recovery of
the Huff v. Welch (1913) instruction, which had not been cited or applied in
sixty years of appellate decisions. In Huff, the jury had been instructed that
a presumption of testamentary capacity existed and that the presumption
was "to be taken into considerationby the jury in determining the question
of competency." 22 In Kiddell, the jury was instructed to find for the proponent unless the opponent introduced "evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of testamentary capacity."23 Notwithstanding the substantial
variance between the Huff and Kiddell instructions, the Virginia Supreme
Court in Kiddell described them as "functional equivalent[s]." 24 An analysis
of the Kiddell instructions in Part Three demonstrates that those instructions
effectively shift the burden of proof to the opponent, thereby rendering
Kiddell the twelfth case silently reversing the burden-of-proof rule.
Section Four provides some other comments on testamentary capacity
litigation including oscillations in the rule regarding the weight given to the
testimony of attesting witnesses and some strategies for lawyers drafting
wills when capacity challenges are anticipated.
II. HISTORY OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
LITIGATION

In Virginia, the degree of mental capacity required at the time of execution of a will is referred to as testamentary capacity. 25 The form of civil ac-

Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622, 628 (Va. 2012).
Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573, 575 (Va. 1913) (quoting Instruction 0) (emphasis added).
23 Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 627 (quoting Instruction 9, second paragraph).
24
Id. at 629 n.4.
21
22

25 Gibbs

v.Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Va. 1990).
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tion in Virginia for litigating whether a writing complies with all of the requirements for a valid will is called inconsistently a will contest 26 and a devisavit vel non, 27 Latin for "she devises or not?"28 Devise is a verb meaning
to give under a will. 29 In Virginia, at least since 1785, the action is tried before a jury.3 0 And, even before the merger of law and equity in Virginia,31
the jury verdict in a will contest bound the chancellor in an unusual way.3 2
Although verdicts by juries in equity proceedings typically did not bind the
chancellor, but only informed his conscience, jury verdicts in will contests
were treated identically with jury verdicts rendered in actions at law.33 Because will contests in Virginia, unlike many other jurisdictions, are heard by
juries,3 4 proper descriptions of the burdens of proof and evidentiary presumptions are important. Will contests are currently governed by sections
64.2-443 to 64.2-449 of the Code of Virginia. 35 The present statutes do not
address burdens of proof, evidentiary presumptions, or jury instructions, nor
have any predecessor statutes done so. 3 6

Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 624.
See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 675 S.E.2d 157 (Va. 2009); Ford v. Gardner, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.)
72, 74 (1806).
26
27

28 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 547 (10th ed. 2009).
29 Id.

'o See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-446 (Repl. Vol. 2012); BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, THE STATUTES AT LARGE,
142 (William Waller Hening ed. 1823) [hereinafter HENING] ("If ... any person interested shall . .. by

his bill in chancery contest the validity of the will, an issue shall be made up, whether the writing produced be the will of the testator or not, which shall be tried by a jury, whose verdict shall be final between the parties; saving to the court a power of granting a new trial for good cause, as in other trials.").
' W. Hamilton Bryson, The Merger of Common-Law and Equity Pleading in Virginia, 41 U. RICH. L.

REV. 77, 78 (2006).
See Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 884 (Va. 1936) ("The verdict in an issue out of chancery is not
to be confused with one upon an issue of devisavit vel non. It is but an incident in litigation in which
there may be many issues, and is intended to satisfy the conscience of the chancellor but does not control him. A verdict on an issue of devisavit vel non ends the litigation in that cause to the same extent
that a jury's verdict settles it in a common-law action.").
32

33 Id.

34 John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with

Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 348 (2013) ("because experience has shown that juries may be more
sympathetic to the disinherited than to the intentions of an eccentric decedent who is in any event beyond suffering, the direction of the law is away from the trial of will contests before a jury.") (internal
citations omitted); see Ronald Chester, Less Law, but More Justice? Jury Trials and Mediation as

Means of Resolving Will Contests, 37 DUQ. L. REv. 173, 178-81 (1999) (of will contests reported nationwide in a 12-month period, opponents won 5 out of 22 bench trials, but won 6 of 8 jury trials); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607, 626 (1987)
(in cases litigated in the county that includes Nashville, TN, in a nine-year period, opponents won 17%
of bench trials, but 42% of jury trials).
3 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2443 to -449 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
36 See generally id. (showing the current Virginia statutes do not address burden of proof, evidentiary
presumptions, or jury instructions).
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Decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia about which party bears the
burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation are replete with periodic
unacknowledged reversals of the rule.3 7 Although opinions in testamentary
capacity cases expressly disclaim their value as precedents,38 that disclaimer
ought to extend only to the factual variance among them, and not to the
precedential value of the rules of law they announce.
The naming convention used in will contest opinions has not been not
consistent over time. Sometimes the person contending that a writing complies with all requirements for constituting a valid will is called the propounder or the proponent.39 Her adversary is called the contestant or opponent. 40 The latter terms (proponent and opponent) tend to be used in the
more recent cases 41, and I will use them, including altering quotations in
older cases for consistency of presentation.
A. The Serpentine Path 42 in the Party Bearing the Burden of Proof in
Testamentary Capacity Litigation
Kiddell v. Labowitz (2012) involved beneficiaries under an earlier will
contesting a later, second writing that was offered as a will, for lack of testamentary capacity. 43 In Kiddell, in order to support the Supreme Court of
Virginia's claim that in testamentary capacity litigation "the burden of proof
is upon those offering a will for probate,"44 the Supreme Court of Virginia
quoted Huff v. Welch, a June 1913 case, 45 and then added, "[flor the next
hundred years, the Court addressed and approved the exact same instruction

See, e.g., Gibbs v. Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Va. 1990); Tabb v. Willis, 156 S.E. 556, 564 (Va.
1931).
3 Tabb, 156 S.E. at 564-65 ("Culpepper v. Robie, 155 Va. [64], 154 S.E. 637, is cited to support [opponents]. That case, to a large extent, turns upon its facts and so is not controlling here.").
" See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-508 (Repl. Vol. 2012); see also Wallen v. Wallen, 57 S.E. 596, 597 (Va.
1907).
40 See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-753 (Repl. Vol. 2012); see also Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622, 627
(Va. 2012).
41 See, e.g., Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 626-27.
42 In a recent article, Judge Kelsey of the Court of Appeals of Virginia wrote that "scientists instinctively
use the argot of lawyers and judges." D. Arthur Kelsey, The Laws of Physics and the Physics of Laws,
VA. LAWYER, Apr. 2014, at 89. Perhaps we could call the Supreme Court of Virginia's decisions on
burdens of proof in testamentary capacity cases, which periodically alternate between polar extremes,
"sinusoidal," yet the intervals between the oscillations are not equal, so we cannot; therefore, "serpentine" is used to denote oscillations between polar extremes at irregular intervals.
43 Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 624.
44 Id. at 630 (quoting Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573, 575, 578 (Va. 1913)).
45 Huff, 78 S.E. at 575.
1
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or a close variant." 46 Kiddell failed to mention that (1) three cases from
1798 to 1825;47 (2) a 1907 case; 48 (3) a March 1913 case (decided 3 months
prior to Huff);49 and (4) three cases in the "next hundred years" after Huff
(and before Kiddell) had placed the burden of proof upon the opponent. 0
Thus, before Kiddell, eight opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia had
placed the burden of proof upon the opponent, yet Kiddell acknowledged
none of them.
1. Cases before Hopkins v. Wampler (1798 to 1907)
The Harrison treatise, a prominent treatise on Virginia wills law, discusses the history of the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation,
and begins the discussion with Burton v. Scott,5 2 an 1825 case. The Harrison
treatise (1) notes that Burton placed the burden of proof upon the opponent;
(2) notes that the burden-of-proof rule was changed by Riddell v. Johnson's
Executor in 1875; and (3) states that the burden of proof thereafter consistently has remained on the proponent.5 3 The Harrison treatise thereby presents the history of the burden-of-proof rule as having had one reversal;
however, the case law has moved back and forth more than once between
placing the burden on the proponent and the opponent. Burton in 1825 did
place the burden of proof upon the opponent,5 4 but so had two earlier cases,
Spencer v. Moore"5 in 1798 and Temple5 6 in 1807.
Spencer, the earliest reported Virginia case, was decided in 1798; the
holding justified the placing of the burden of proof upon the opponent as a
consequence of the pervasive presumption of human sanity: "Those who
would impeach any act on the ground of incompetency in the grantor (his
general competency being presumed) must clearly prove that incompetency

Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 629 (citing Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151, 160-61 (Va. 1950); Jenkins v.
Trice, 147 S.E 251, 260 (Va. 1929); Rust v. Reid, 97 S.E.2d 324, 331(Va. 1918)).
47 Burton v. Scott, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 399 (1825); Temple v. Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476 (1807);
Spencer v. Moore, 8 Va. (4 Call) 423 (1798).
48 Wallen v. Wallen, 57 S.E. 596 (Va. 1907).
49Woody v. Taylor, 77 S.E. 498 (Va. 1913).
5oTate, 57 S.E.2d at 151; Tabb v. Willis, 156 S.E. 556 (Va. 1931); Smith v. Ottley, 132 S.E. 512 (Va.
1926).
46

5' HARRISON ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION FOR VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA § 8.10 (James P.

Cox, III ed., 4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013).
52 Burton v. Scott, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 399 (1825).
5 HARRISON ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION FOR VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA, supra note 51, §

8.10.
54Burton, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) at 400.
5 Spencer v. Moore, 8 Va. (4 Call) 423, 425 (1798).
56 Temple v. Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476
(1807).
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to exist, as at the time of executing the instrument in question."17 Although
Spencer cited no cases on that point, both its result and reasoning followed
the common law."8

Swinbume's treatise provides this common law rule regarding the burden
of proof in testamentary capacity cases: "Every person is presumed to be of
perfect mind and memory, unless the contrary is proved. And therefore if
any person go about to impugn or overthrow the testament by reason of insanity of mind, or want of memory, he must prove that impediment."59
The Commonwealth of Virginia adopted the common law by ordinance

enacted in convention of May, 1776.60 In 1792, "so much of the ordinance
of 1776 as adopted the acts of Parliament of a general nature .

.

. was re-

pealed by the Legislature; but that part of the ordinance of 1776, which established the common law until it should be altered by legislative power,

has never been repealed." 61 Pursuant to that legislative direction, the Supreme Court of Virginia has applied the common law whenever "[t]he Legislature, which is the representative of the sovereign power of the people,
and specially charged with the duty of making or amending laws to meet
their needs, has not at any time enacted any law changing the rule of the

common law with respect to the matter under consideration." 62
Thus, in 1798 Spencer could have cited the common law in support of its
decision, and that would have been fully consistent with the 1792 and 1776
legislative acts receiving the common law. It appears that no Supreme
Court of Virginia decision has ever cited a Virginia statute addressing the
burden of proof in testamentary capacity cases. 63 Consequently, the Court in

Spencer reached the correct result for the correct reason; and it should not
have been changed, even though it has on about a dozen occasions."

1 Spencer, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 425. Spencer reversed the trial court's decision in favor of the will, because
the opponent had "clearly proved ... that [testator] was, at a time anterior to the execution of his will,
incompetent to make a distribution of his property." Id. at 426.
58 Id. at 423.

5 1 HENRY SWINBURNE, A TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS 119 (7th ed. 1803) (emphasis

added).
60 HENING, supra note 30, at 127 ("The common law of England, all statutes or acts of Parliament made
in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of King James the First, and which are of a
general nature . . . shall be considered as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative
power of this colony.").
61 Foster v. Commonwealth, 31 S.E. 503, 504 (Va.
1898).
62 Id. at 505.
63I have been unable to locate any Supreme Court of Virginia decision citing a Virginia statute on point.
64See generally Spencer v. Moore, 8 Va. (4 Call) 423 (1798) (assessing the case on the principle that the
burden of proof of incompetency rests with the opponent).
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Next after Spencer, Temple (1807) placed the burden of proof upon the
opponent, but indicated that it was a consequence of the proof of due execution of the writing as a will.
It having been proved to this Court by the evidence of three credible and respectable witnesses, who were well acquainted with the [testator], that the paper-writing exhibited in this court, purporting to be the last will and testament
of the [testator], was wholly written by himself, that circumstance, prima facie,
amounts to presumptive proof of his deliberate intention and capacity to make a
will at the time of writing the same. 65

As the ensuing discussion will show, the consequences arising from the
presumption of testamentary capacity, which is sometimes said to arise
from proof of due execution and sometimes not, has varied significantly
during the 205 years between Temple (1807) and Kiddell (2012), although,
in a refrain to be mentioned throughout this presentation, the Supreme
Court of Virginia never has acknowledged that variance. Temple, the first
case to consider the presumption of testamentary capacity, (1) stated that it
arose upon proof of due execution, and (2) held that the consequence of the
presumption was to place the burden of proof upon the opponent. 66
An initial point to consider, which has yet to be discussed in a Virginia
case, is how the condition of due execution is meaningless; it simply restates an existing element that the proponent already must prove. 6 7 If a jury
decides that due execution has not been shown, the case will end there; testamentary capacity is never decided for a writing that has not been executed
in a manner sufficient to constitute a will. 68 Although some cases state that
the presumption of testamentary capacity arises upon proof of due execution, the inclusion of this condition is a pointless addition.
The next case decided after Temple was Burton (1825); the Court ignored Temple's use of a presumption of testamentary capacity, re-adopted
Spencer's result and reasoning, and quoted a 1792 English case for the burden-of-proof rules in testamentary capacity cases.

Temple v. Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476,477 (1807).
66 Id. at 477.
67 VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL R. 48.000 (Repl. ed. 2014) ("The only question in this
case is whether this writing is [these writings are] the last will of (name of decedent). In deciding this
question, you will have to consider these issues: (1) Was the writing properly executed? (2) Did (name
of decedent) have testamentary intent when he signed it? (3) Did (name of decedent) have testamentary
capacity when he signed it? On these issues, the proponents of the will have the burden of proof by the
greater weight of the evidence."). See infra note 313.
68 As well, following Virginia's 2007 adoption of the harmless error statute of the Uniform Probate
Code, failures in execution will be exceedingly rare. See infra notes 314-320 and accompanying text.
65
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The natural presumption is, that every man is sane and competent to make a
will, and this presumption must stand, until destroyed by proof on the other
side. To say that insanity must be presumed, until sanity be proved, would seem
to be saying that insanity is the natural state of the human mind. "The course of
procedure, for the purpose of trying the state of the party's mind, allows of
rules. If derangement be alledged, it is clearly incumbent on the party alledging
it, to prove such derangement. If such derangement be proved, or be admitted to
have existed at any particular period, but a lucid interval be alledged to have
prevailed at the period particularly referred to, then the burthen of proof attaches on the party alledging such lucid interval, who must shew sanity and competence at the period when the act was done, and to which the lucid interval re69
fers."

Thus, although all three of the earliest Virginia cases (Spencer, Temple,
and Burton) placed the burden of proof upon the opponent, the justifications
for the rule oscillated between a general presumption of sanity and a presumption of testamentary capacity arising upon proof of due execution. No
explanation of the oscillation in rationale was provided. Next, the burdenof-proof rule itself would change.
As the Harrison treatise notes, in 1875, Riddell put the burden of proof
upon proponents;70 but so had Coalter's Executor v. Bryan in 1844.71 Neither Bryan nor Riddell acknowledged that the matter ever had been decided
by the Supreme Court of Virginia, and, failed to state any reasons for reversing the burden-of-proof rule of Spencer, Temple, and Burton. Shortly
after Riddell, three cases, decided between 1888 and 1903 (Tucker v. Sandidge,72 Chappell v. Trent,73 and Gray v. Rumrill74), pressed even harder on

Burton v. Scott, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 399, 400 (1825) (emphasis added) (quoting Attorney Gen. v.
Parnther, (1792) 29 Eng. Rep. 632.
7o Riddell v. Johnson's Ex'r, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 152, 177 (1875) ("the onus probandi lies in every case
upon the party propounding a will; and he must satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument so
propounded is the last will of a free and capable testator" (citing Barry v. Butlin, (1838) 163 Eng. Rep.
223 (P.C.)).
7' Coalter's Ex'r v. Bryan, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 18, 83 (1844) ("[T]he [proponents] of the will [have] the
burthen of maintaining not only the due execution thereof, but the capacity, freedom, and final action of
the testator, and the continued validity of the instrument in all respects.").
72 Tucker v. Sandidge, 8 S.E. 650, 654-55 (Va. 1888) ("The onus probandi is upon the party who seeks
to set up the instrument in question; and this, from the fact that the [proponent] alleges that the paper
offered for probate is the true will of a free and capable testator; and hence it devolves upon him to make
good his allegation, that is, to prove by competent testimony that the instrument is what it purports to be;
for in every such case the conscience of the court is to be satisfied, and nothing short of clear and convincing evidence will suffice. This doctrine has been uniformly recognized and acted on by this court."
(citing Riddell, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) at 152) (emphasis added)).
Chappell v. Trent, 19 S.E. 314, 343 (Va. 1893) ("Upon this subject the jury should have been instructed in clear, strong, and unambiguous terms, that it must appear by clear and convincing evidence that
the testator at the time of the execution of the paper retained sufficient active mind and memory to enable him to collect and arrange in his mind, without prompting by others, the particulars or elements of
the business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive at least
69
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the proponents, (1) by raising the evidentiary standard to require that proponents prove testamentary capacity by "clear and convincing evidence"
and (2) by creating a separate requirement that the trial court be "judicially
satisfied that the paper in question is in reality what it purports to be,"'7
even when a jury was the finder of fact. Those three cases constitute the
high water mark of evidentiary pressure on the proponent: (1) burden of
proof; (2) by clear and convincing evidence; (3) without operation of a presumption of sanity or a presumption of testamentary capacity; and (4) with
an additional requirement that the trial court independently "be judicially
satisfied," a standard of review apparently less deferential than the normal
review that a trial court exercises over all civil jury verdicts. 76
These high-water-mark cases (Tucker, Chappell, and Gray) did not discuss the general presumption of sanity, the presumption of testamentary capacity, or the earlier cases (Spencer, Temple, and Burton) that had placed
the burden of proof on the opponent because of those presumptions. Four
years after Gray, Wallen v. Wallen77 (1907) reversed the the burden-ofproof rule of the high-water-mark cases, without discussing them . Wallen
discussed both presumptions (citing Temple but not Burton); and merged
them into the single presumption of testamentary capacity arising upon
proof of due execution.78 Wallen quoted Temple and held that the presumption shifted the burden of proof to the opponent. 79
While Wallen correctly interpreted Temple's holding about the presumption of testamentary capacity arising upon proof of due execution, the decision ignored Burton's holding that the presumption of sanity created a rule
of law placing the burden of proof upon the opponent. More egregiously,
after stating and reiterating the Temple holding, Wallen claimed that Temple

their obvious relations to each other and to be able to form some rational judgment in relation to them;
and that if he was unable to do this without prompting, he was incompetent to make a valid will." (emphasis added)).
7' Gray v. Rumrill, 44 S.E. 697, 699 (Va. 1903) ("The onus probandi is upon the party who seeks to set
up the instrument in question, and this from the fact that the [proponent] alleges that the paper offered
for probate is the true will of a free and capable testator, and hence it devolves upon him to make good
his allegation (that is, to prove by competent testimony that the instrument is what it purports to be), for
in every such case the conscience of the court is to be satisfied, and nothing short of clear and convincing evidence will suffice. This doctrine has been uniformly recognized and acted on by this court." (emphasis added)).
' Tucker, 8 S.E. at 661.
76 The requirement of judicial satisfaction beyond the normal review of civil jury verdicts does not ap-

pear to have surfaced in any other case.
7 Wallen v. Wallen, 57 S.E. 596 (Va. 1907).
71 See id. at 598.

7 Id. at 599.
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was "decided just one hundred years ago and never since questioned." 0 But
of course, Wallen's claim of a hundred-year consistency with Temple suffers from a glaring error. Between Temple (1807) and Wallen (1907), five
cases (Bryan, Riddell, Tucker, Chappell, and Gray) did more than merely

question Temple, they held, in silent reversal of Temple (and Burton and
Spencer), that the burden of proof was on the proponent, and the Bryan
through Gray cases made no mention of any presumption available to benefit the proponent. The following is Wallen's description of the burden-ofproof scheme in testamentary capacity litigation.
It is true that the [proponents] of a will have the burden placed upon them of
proving the testamentary capacity of the decedent; but when a paper writing is
offered to a probate court, and it is shown that the formalities required by the
statute in such case made and provided have been complied with, and especially where it appears that the paper is wholly in the handwriting of and signed by
the testator-is in form an holograph will-there is a presumption of testamentary
capacity. There is, indeed, a presumption in favor of the sanity of every man
until evidence that he is of unsound mind is introduced; and this presumption
applies in all cases, criminal as well as civil.
So it was held in Temple, a case decided just one hundred years ago and never
since questioned, that "The circumstance that a writing, exhibited for probate as
a last will and testament, was wholly written by the testator himself, is prima
facie evidence that he was in his senses and able to make a will at the time of
writing the same; so that the onus probandi to repel that presumption lies on

those who wish to impugn it. . . ."

Onus probandi is Latin for "burden of proof."8 2 So, in the successive paragraphs quoted above, Wallen states that "the [proponents] of a will have
the burden placed upon them of proving the testamentary capacity of the
decedent," but if due execution is shown a presumption of testamentary capacity arises and "the onus probandi [burden of proof] to repel that presumption lies on those who wish to impugn it." The clear, combined consequence of those two statements in Wallen, like Temple's holding, places the
burden of proof upon the opponent when due execution is shown.
2. Hopkins v. Wampler (1908)
One year after Wallen, Hopkins v. Wampler (1908) reversed (again in silence) Wallen's re-adoption of Temple's burden-of-proof scheme.83 In Hop-

so Id.
" Id. at 598-99 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
82 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (9th ed. 2009).
" See generally Hopkins v. Wampler, 62 S.E. 926 (Va. 1908) (concluding the burden of proving the
sanity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will rests with the proponents).
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kins, the trial court (apparently applying the high-water-mark cases) placed
the burden of proof upon the proponent, required the proponent to prove
testamentary capacity by clear and convincing evidence, and did not mention any presumption available to benefit the proponent.8 4 The Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed (1) for requiring the higher degree of proof,5 and
(2) for failing to instruct the jury about the presumption of sanity arising
upon proof of due execution.8 6
As noted above, Wallen rediscovered both the presumption of sanity and
the presumption arising from due execution, merged them into a single presumption of testamentary capacity arising upon proof of due execution, and
concluded that "the onus probandi [burden of proof] to repel that presumption lies on those who wish to impugn it."17 Conversely, Hopkins concluded
that the presumption of testamentary capacity arising upon proof of due execution did not shift the burden of proof to the opponent; instead, it merely
required the opponent to introduce evidence of incapacity, 8 but Hopkins
added that the jury would be told about the presumption. Hopkins stated,
"Where, however, the sanity of the testator is put in issue by the evidence of
the [opponent], the onus probandi lies upon the proponent to satisfy the
court or jury that the writing propounded is the will of a capable testator,"8 9
and "in determining that question [of testamentary capacity] the jury should
also have taken into consideration the presumption in favor of testatrix's
sanity." 90
Hopkins does not discuss Wallen, but Hopkins significantly altered the
Wallen rule, while citing that case, 91 and similarly quoted Burton and cited
Temple; yet Burton and Temple had held the exact opposite-that the burden
of proof was on the opponent-as the Hopkins court's quotation shows. 92

Hopkins, 62 S.E. at 927 ("The unqualified language of this instruction, which wholly omits the presumption in favor of sanity and announces the proposition that the burden of proving testamentary capacity by clear and convincing testimony is upon the proponents, is not in harmony with the established
rule on that subject . .
84

85 Id.

at 927-28.

86 Id.

Wallen v. Wallen, 57 S.E. 596, 599 (Va. 1907) (quoting Temple v. Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476
(1807)).
Hopkins, 62 S.E. at 928.
8

8 Id.
90

at 927.

Id. at 927-28.87.
' Id. at 927 (citing Wallen, 57 S.E. at 596).
92 Id. ("In Burton v. Scott, in discussing the rules of evidence which govern questions of insanity in cases
of probate, observes: 'I understood the counsel for the appellants (the [opponents]) to lay it down, as a
general rule, that it was incumbent on the devisee claiming under a will to prove the sanity of the testator; that the onus was upon him in every question of this sort. Taken in this latitude, I do not consider the
position correct. The natural presumption is that every man is sane and competent to make a will, and
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Consequently, while (1) Spencer (1798) and Burton (1825) used the presumption of human sanity to create a rule of law placing the burden of
proof upon opponents; (2) Temple (1825) used the presumption of testamentary capacity arising upon proof of due execution to place the burden of
proof upon opponents; and (3) Wallen employed the rediscovered combined
presumption of testamentary capacity and presumption of sanity to shift the
burden of proof to the opponent upon proof of due execution, Hopkins said
the only meaningful consequence of the presumption of testamentary capacity is that the jury will be told about it.93
Before we conclude that Hopkins inaugurated a hundred-year consistency in doctrine, as Kiddell asserted,94 the ensuing analysis of burden-of-proof
cases after Hopkins negates any claim of consistency. Between Hopkins and
Kiddell, nineteen cases considered the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation: (1) five cases consistently applied the Hopkins rule; 95 (2)
three cases placed the burden of proof upon the proponents without mention
of any presumption of testamentary capacity in the opinion; 96 (3) seven cases placed the burden of proof upon the proponents, said that the presumption of testamentary capacity arising upon proof of due execution existed,
but indicated that the presumption was of the common variety and not told
to the jury; 97 and (4) four cases placed the burden of proof upon the opponents, 98 (including Tate v. Chumbley, which placed the burden on the proponent but instructed the jury that the presumption governed "until the contrary is proved"). 99

this presumption must stand until destroyed by proof on the other side. To say that insanity must be presumed until sanity be proved would seem to be saying that insanity is the natural state of the human
mind."' (citing Temple v. Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476 (1807); Porter v. Porter, 15 S.E. 500 (Va.
1892); Wallen, 57 S.E. 596).

" Hopkins, 62 S.E. at 928 ("in determining that question the jury should also have taken into consideration the presumption in favor of testatrix's sanity.").
94Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622, 629 (Va. 2012).
95See Culpepper v. Robie, 154 S.E. 687, 689 (Va. 1930); Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251, 259-60 (Va.
1929); Greenv. Green's Ex'rs, 143 S.E. 683, 687 (Va. 1928); Rusty. Reid, 97 S.E. 324, 331 (Va. 1918);
Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573, 575 (Va. 1913); see infra Section I.A.3.
96 See Fields v. Fields, 499 S.E.2d 826, 828 (Va. 1998); Walton v. Walton, 191 S.E. 768, 769 (Va.
1937); Lester's Ex'rv. Simpkins, 83 S.E. 1062, 1063 (Va. 1915); see infra Section I.A.3.
9 See Weedon v. Weedon, 720 S.E.2d 552, 558 (Va. 2012); Parish v. Parish, 704 S.E.2d 99, 104 (Va.
2011); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Va. 1990); Croft v. Snidow, 33 S.E.2d 208, 211 (Va.
1945); Hall v. Hall, 23 S.E.2d 810, 815 (Va. 1943); Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 883 (Va. 1936);
Dickens v. Bonnewell, 108 S.E. 610, 611, 614 (Va. 1933); see infra Section I.A.3.
9' See Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151, 160 (Va. 1950); Tabb v. Willis, 156 S.E. 556, 563 (Va. 1931);
Smith v. Ottley, 132 S.E. 512, 513 (Va. 1926); Wooddy v. Taylor, 77 S.E. 498, 500 (Va. 1913); see infra Section I.A.3.
9 Tate, 57 S.E.2d at 160.
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To support its claim of the hundred-year consistency, the Kiddell majority opinion found and discussed three of the five cases that consistently applied the Hopkins rule, but missed the other two, although the concurring
opinion did not. 100 The Kiddell majority opinion (1) did not discuss the fourteen cases clearly inconsistent with Hopkins; (2) said Tate was consistent
with Hopkins, when it is not;101 and (3) cited two cases not consistent with
Hopkins, but only for points other than the burden of proof or the presumption of testamentary capacity. 102
In Hopkins, in addition to placing the burden of proof upon the proponent and telling trial courts to instruct the jury about the presumption, Hopkins reversed the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard applied by the
trial court, and the manner in which the Hopkins court discussed its abandoning of the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard is curious.
It was suggested in the argument of the case in judgment, that a higher degree
of proof of testamentary capacity was required in Tucker v. Sandidge; Chappell
v. Trent, and Gray v. Rumrill.

In those cases, it is true, the court does say that "nothing short of clear and convincing evidence will suffice," or that the proof must be "clear and convincing." But to sustain that proposition Tucker v. Sandridge cites Riddell v. Johnson; Chappell v. Trent refers to no authority; and Gray v. Rumrill cites the two

former cases. So it will be observed that these cases rely upon Riddell v. Johnson and, while they change the phraseology of the rule, it is not believed that it
was intended to modify the well-settled doctrine of the degree of proof required
in that class of cases. 103

Thus in Hopkins, the Supreme Court of Virginia (1) indicated that it was
abandoning the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard of Tucker, Chappell, and Gray; (2) grounded its abandonment of a second rule (the requirement of clear and convincing evidence) contrary to a first rule (the requirement of greater weight of the evidence) on the failure of the secondrule cases to cite the first-rule cases; (3) stated that changes in phraseology
in an opinion do not "modify the well-settled doctrine;" (4) yet made no
mention that Hopkins was reversing Wallen (without discussing it) on

which party bears the burden of proof when the presumption of testamentary capacity operates; and (5) made no mention that in Bryan through

.00
Kiddell quotes Huff and Rust, and cites Trice, but misses Green and Culpepper. See Kiddell, 733
S.E.2d at 628-29 (citing Trice, 147 S.E. at 260) (quoting Rust, 97 S.E. at 331; Huff, 78 S.E. at 575, 578).
The concurring opinion cites Green and Culpepper in a footnote. See id. at 637 (McClanahan, J., concurring) (citing Culpepper, 154 S.E. at 260; Green, 143 S.E. at 686).
'' Id. at 629-30.

Id. at 628, 632-33, 635 (citing Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d at 500, 501) (citing Weedon, 720 S.E.2d at 558)
(citing Tabb, 156 S.E. at 564) (citing Hall, 23 S.E.2d at 814) (citing Parish,702 S.E.2d at 104).
1o3 Hopkins v. Wampler, 62 S.E. 926, 927 (Va. 1908).
102
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Gray, the Supreme Court of Virginia had reversed Spencer through Burton,
and did so without citing those first-rule cases.
As noted above and described below, nineteen testamentary capacity
cases decided between Hopkins and Kiddell continued to violate the Supreme Court of Virginia's own rules of legal method, discussed in Hopkins,
by modifying the doctrine of Hopkins, without recognition of any conflict
or explanation of any changes.
3. Cases after Hopkins v. Wampler (1913 to 2012)
Five years after Hopkins, Wooddy v. Taylor (1913) reversed the burden
back to the opponent, citing Temple and no other Virginia testamentary capacity cases. 104 Notably, Wooddy did not read Temple as using the presumption of testamentary capacity arising upon proof of due execution to shift
the burden of proof to the opponent. Instead, like Spencer and Burton (but
not citing them), Wooddy declared a rule that the burden always was upon
the opponent, '" [t]hose who would impeach the will on the ground that the
decedent has become incompetent, must clearly prove that incompetency to
105
exist."
Three months later, in June of 1913, Huff06 returned to the Hopkins rules,
without citation or discussion of Hopkins or of any other testamentary capacity cases, yet oddly quoting Wooddy about the weight given to the testimony of attesting witnesses.10 7 Huff ignored Wooddy's rule that the burden
of proof in testamentary capacity litigation is always on the opponent. Huff
returned to the Hopkins rule, without citing that case, by placing the burden
on the proponent, and Huff enhanced the Hopkins rule by expressly approv10
ing a jury instruction about the presumption of testamentary capacity.o

'" See Wooddy v. Taylor, 77 S.E. 498, 500 (Va. 1913).
15 Id. at 500. The court quoted Robertson's Old Practice, vol. 3, p. 337 as follows: "Those who would

impeach the will on the ground that the decedent has become incompetent must clearly prove that incompetency to exist." Id. Robertson's Old Practice cited Temple v. Temple to support its statement, and
Wooddy included that in its quotation. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia in Wooddy then said, the
"principles announced by this high authority have been repeatedly upheld by this court, the latest cases
being Howard v. Howard, [112 Va. 566 (1911)], and Wampler v. Harrell, 112 Va. 635, 72 S.E. 135
[1911]." Id. Howard and Wampler were not wills cases, but cases about deeds. 112 Va. at 566; 112 Va.
at 635.
106 Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573 (Va. 1913).
See id. at 579.
S

o See id. at 575 (quoting Instruction 0). In Huff, the court extensively quoted jury instructions in the
Statement section of the opinion, one of which stated, "the burden of proof is upon those offering a will
for probate." Id. In Huff, the jury instructions were not at issue in the case, because the court reversed on
the facts, finding the jury verdict was a "plain and palpable deviation from the proof." Id at 579. How-
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Two years later, Lester's Executor v. Simpkins (1915) kept the burden on

the proponent, but, contrary to Wallen's and Hopkins' supposed reversal of
heightened proof, required proof of testamentary capacity by clear and convincing evidence, and contrary to Wallen, Hopkins, and Huff, made no mention of any presumption in favor of the proponent. 109
Next, Rust"10 (1918) (1) reiterated the Hopkins rule placing the burden on
the proponent,' and (2) again approved the Huff instruction, which told the
jury about the presumption of testamentary capacity. 112 Rust did not mention
requiring clear and convincing evidence of testamentary capacity, and the
requirement of clear and convincing evidence has not since been made, except when the putative testator is adjudicated insane prior to the execution
of the writing.113
The party bearing the burden of proof next reversed in 1926, when it was
placed back on the opponent by Smith v. Ottley,1 14 which quoted Wooddy
and Wooddy's citing of Temple. Like Wooddy, Ottley did not interpret Tem-

ple as employing the presumption of testamentary capacity to shift the burden of proof to the opponent. Instead, Ottley declared a rule that the burden

ever in the opinion, the Huff court did write, "[t]he instructions given by the court, all of which will appear with the official report of this opinion, were ample to submit to the jury fully and fairly the case."
Id. at 578.
109See generally Lester's Ex'r v. Simpkins, 83 S.E. 1062 (Va. 1915). In Lester's Executor, the Supreme
Court of Virginia gave blanket approval to jury instructions quoted in the Statement section of that opinion. "It would serve no good purpose to undertake to review the instructions as given by the court, and
which will be set out with the official report of this opinion. Suffice it to say that they, in our judgment,
fully and fairly submitted the issues of the case to the jury upon the facts which the evidence in the case
tended to prove." Id. at 1068. One instruction placed the burden of proof upon the proponents. Id. at at
1063 (quoting Instruction 1). Another required proof by "clear and convincing evidence." Id. (quoting
Instruction 3).
..
0 Rust v. Reid, 97 S.E. 324 (Va. 1918).
"' Id. at 331.
112Id. ("The burden of proving testamentary capacity is on the [proponent] of the will and continues
upon him throughout any contest on that question; but, when he has shown a compliance with all the
statutory requirements for the due execution of a will, the legal presumption of sanity comes to his relief, and dispenses with any evidence to the contrary. The proof of due execution, therefore, entitles the
[proponent] prima facie to have the will admitted to probate.").
" Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151, 161 (Va. 1950) ("[T]he condition of insanity established by the
committal proceedings ... is presumed to continue, and the burden is on ... the proponent of the purported will ... to establish by clear and convincing evidence that on that date [the putative testator] was
possessed of testamentary capacity") (quoting trial court's instruction with approval)). In Gilmer v.
Brown, the court contrasted an adjudication of insanity, for which a presumption arises, and an appointment of a guardian, for which a presumption does not. 44 S.E.2d 16, 20 (Va. 1947) ("The provisions of
the pertinent [mental health] statutes ... reveal the legislative intent to recognize a distinction between,
and to make different provisions for, the insane and the mentally or physically incapacitated.").
"14 See Smith v. Ottley, 132 S.E. 512, 513-14 (Va. 1926) ("Those who would impeach the will on the
ground that the decedent has become incompetent, must clearly prove that incompetency to exist.")
(quoting Wooddy v. Taylor, 77 S.E. 498 (Va. 1913)).
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always is upon the opponent," 5 which, although not citing those cases, was
a return to the rule of Spencer, Burton, and Wooddy.
Next, Green v. Green's Executors 16 (1928), Jenkins v. Trice'17 (1929),
and Culpepper v. RobieI8 (1930) silently reversed Ottley by returning the

burden of proof back to the proponent. All three cases reiterated the Hopkins rule, by placing the burden on the proponent and approving the Huff
instruction telling the jury about the presumption of testamentary capacity. 119
Next, Tabb v. Willis120 (1931) reversed the burden back to the opponent,
citing Temple and Ottley. Like Ottley (and Wooddy), Tabb did not interpret
Temple as employing the presumption of testamentary capacity to shift the
burden of proof to the opponent. 121 Instead, Tabb declared a rule that the
burden is always upon the opponent. 122 Although not citing those cases,
Tabb was a return to the rule of Spencer, Burton, and Wooddy, and Ottley.

"

Id.

116See generally Greenv. Green's Ex'rs, 143 S.E. 683 (Va. 1928). In Green, the Supreme Court of Vir-

ginia quoted many instructions, including this one: "And while the burden of proof is upon those offering a will for probate to show testamentary capacity on the part of the testator at the time the will was
executed, yet the court tells the jury that there is in all cases an existing presumption in favor of the testator's sanity and capacity, which is to be taken into consideration by the jury in determining the question of competency." Id. at 686. The Supreme Court of Virginia included that instruction in its blanket
approval of the instructions given. "A careful consideration of all the instructions granted satisfies us
that they are free from error, and that when read together, as they should be, they fairly and sufficiently
instructed the jury upon the law applicable to the case. It follows, therefore, that the appellant was not
prejudiced by the court's refusal to give other instructions." Id. at 687.
"7 See generally Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251 (Va. 1929). The Supreme Court of Virginia quoted an
instruction that included the following, "the burden of proof is upon those offering a will for probate, to
show testamentary capacity on the part of the testator at the time the will was executed to the satisfaction
of the jury." Id. at 260. The Supreme Court of Virginia said that "it was approved in [Huff] and [Rust]."
Id (citations omitted).
1" See generally Culpepper v. Robie, 154 S.E. 687 (Va. 1930). The Supreme Court of Virginia quoted
the following jury instruction: "The court instructs the jury that while the burden of proof is upon those
offering a will for probate, to show testamentary capacity on the part of the testator at the time the will
was executed to the satisfaction of the jury, yet the court tells the jury that there is in all cases an existing
presumption in favor of the testator's sanity and capacity, which is to be taken into consideration by the
jury in determining the question of competency." Id. at 689. The Supreme Court of Virginia did not discuss the instruction, but included it in a blanket approval. "[I]nasmuch as the instructions given substantially cover the issues and the evidence, the refusal of the trial court to give any of these latter instructions is not reversible error." Id. at 695.
"'See Culpepper, 154 S.E. at 689-90; Trice, 147 S.E. at 260; Green, 143 S.E. at 686.
120Tabb v. Willis, 156 S.E. 556 (Va. 1931).
121 Id. at 564. ("[T]hose who would impeach a will on the ground that the decedent had become
incompetent must clearly prove that incompetency to exist").
122 Id.
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In addition, Tabb cited Huff and two wills cases that did not discuss burdens
of proof in testamentary capacity litigation. 123
Next, five cases from 1933 to 1945, Dickens v. Bonnewell, 124 Redford v.
Booker,125 Walton v. Walton,126 Hall v. Hall,127 and Croft v. Snidow,128 silently reversed Tabb by returning the burden of proof back to the proponent.129
However, in each of those five the jury was not instructed about the presumption of testamentary capacity. 130 Dickens, Redford, Hall, and Croft
stated that the presumption existed, but limited its consequence to requiring
the opponent to introduce evidence contesting capacity; those cases did not
indicate that the jury was, or should have been, instructed about the presumption. 131 Walton did not discuss the presumption at all. 132
A reversal in the party bearing the burden of proof next occurs in 1950.
Tate1 33 concluded that the presumption of testamentary capacity shifted the
burden of proof to the opponent, but Tate neither cited nor discussed any

Id. at 564 (citing Smith v. Ottley, 132 S.E. 512 [(Va. 1926)]; Portner v. Portner, 112 S.E. 762 [(Va.
1922)]; Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573 [(Va. 1913)]; Parramore v. Taylor, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 220 [(1854)];
Temple v. Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476 [(1807)]). Parramoredid not involve the burden of proof
for testamentary capacity, but for proving undue influence. 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) at 220. Portner did not
discuss burdens of proof at all. 112 S.E. 762.
124 Dickens v. Bonnewell, 168 S.E. 610, 612 (Va. 1933) ("when 'the sanity of the testator is put in issue
by the evidence of the [opponent], the onus probandi lies upon the proponent to satisfy the court or jury
that the writing propounded is the will of a capable testator"' (quoting Hopkins v. Wampler, 62 S.E.
926, 927 (Va. 1908))).
125 Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 883 (Va. 1936). "The burden of proving testamentary capacity is on
the [proponent] of the will and continues upon him throughout any contest on that question." (citing
Dickens v. Bonnewell, 168 S.E. 610 [(Va. 1933)]; Good v. Dyer, 119 S.E. 277 [(Va. 1923)]). Good v.
Dyer is not a wills case. It considers whether a promissory note is enforceable against an estate. 119 S.E.
at 277.
126 Walton v. Walton, 191 S.E. 768, 770 (Va. 1937) (citing Dickens v. Bonnewell, 168 S.E. 610, 612
(Va. 1933)). When reversing the trial court's granting of a motion to strike all the evidence, the Supreme
Court of Virginia stated, "[a] s the affirmative of the issue was on the [proponents], their motion was not
to strike all of the evidence, but only that offered by appellants. There is some difference between the
issue here raised, and the issue in usual common law actions. In the latter, plaintiff has to bear the burden of proof, hence [proponents] were not in a position to move for the elimination of all evidence, if
they desired the will to be probated." Id.
127 Hall v. Hall, 23 S.E.2d 810, 815 (Va. 1943) ("The burden of proving testamentary capacity is on the
[proponent] of the will and continues upon him throughout any contest on that question." (quoting Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 883 (Va. 1936))).
128 Croft v. Snidow, 33 S.E.2d 208, 212 (Va. 1945) ("Thus upon a case like this, if all the statutory requirements for due execution be shown the legal presumption of sanity comes to the proponents' relief.
A prima facie case is made out, and the burden then rests upon the [opponents] to produce evidence if
this presumption is to be overcome." (quoting Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 883 (Va. 1936))).
123

129See supra notes 124-28.
13o

See infra text accompanying notes 131-32.

'' See supra notes 124-29.
132See supra note 126.

'33 Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151, 160 (Va. 1950)).
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cases on the point. Although not citing those cases, Tate approved an in-

struction similar to (1) the holding in Temple and (2) the instruction approved in Wallen. Temple, Wallen, and Tate employed the presumption of

testamentary capacity to shift the burden of proof to the opponent. However, while Temple and Wallen conditioned the burden shift upon the finding
of due execution, 13 4 Tate conditioned the burden shift only on the testator
not having been adjudicated insane.135 Here is the Tate instruction:
And while the burden of proof is upon those offering a will for probate, to show
testamentary capacity on the part of the testatrix at the time the will was executed to the satisfaction of the jury, yet the court tells the jury that all persons
who have not been adjudged insane are presumed to be sane and capable of
making a will until the contrary is proved, and that this presumption is to be
taken into consideration by the jury in determining the question of competency.
136

While Tate did not cite or discuss any testamentary capacity cases when
approving that jury instruction, the decision did cite testamentary capacity
cases for points other than the burden of proof, including Chappell,137 Redford,138 Lester's Executor,139 and Trice.140

Forty years passed without a Supreme Court of Virginia case analyzing
burdens of proof or presumptions in testamentary capacity cases.141 Next,
Gibbs in 1990 reversed a trial court decision for improperly placing the

'34See supra text accompanying notes 65-66, 79.
'35Tate, 57 S.E.2d at 160; see infra note 136 and accompanying text.
136Tate, 57 S.E.2d at 160 (emphasis added) (quoting Instruction B). In Tate, the appellant argued that

"the burden imposed upon the proponents of the respective wills was not sufficiently observed during
the trial or clearly pointed out to the jury." The court quoted the instructions, including Instruction B,

and wrote, "the character of proof incumbent upon the respective proponents was made evident to the
jury." Note that the instruction says "until the contrary"-lack of testamentary capacity-is proved, not
"contested," "rebutted," "contradicted," or "introduced." Id.
" Id. at 161 (citing Chappell v. Trent, 19 S.E. 314, 326 (Va. 1983)) (the duty of attesting witnesses).
13 Id. at 161, 162 (citing Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 884, 886 (Va. 1936)) (the standard of appellate review and the duty of attesting witnesses).
'" Id. at 158-59 (quoting Lester's Ex'r v. Simpkins, 83 S.E. 1062, 1066 (Va. 1915)) (the admissibility
of expert opinion).
140 Id. at 158, 162 (citing Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251, 260-62 (Va. 1929)) (the rule that mental status
at the time of executing the will is controlling, the rule of lucid intervals, and the rule that no error results when the trial judge refuses to give additional relevant instructions to the jury).
14' After Tate, W. State Hosp. v. Wininger affirmed a trial court's setting aside of a jury verdict in favor
of an instrument executed after the putative testator had been adjudicated insane. The Supreme Court of
Virginia stated, "[c]lear and convincing proof that capacity existed at the time the will was executed is
required to overcome the existing primafacie presumption of lack of capacity. That character of proof
may not be supplied by indulgence in conjecture, surmise or speculation. Nothing short of clear proof of
capacity when the instrument was drawn and executed will suffice." 183 S.E.2d 446, 453 (Va. 1954).
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burden of proof upon the opponent and requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence. 142 That decision silently reversed Tate.
Thereafter, Fields v. Fields 43 (1998), Parish v. Parish44 (2011), and
Weedon v. Weedonl 45 (2012) also placed the burden of proof upon proponents. However, in each of those four cases the jury was not instructed
about the presumption of testamentary capacity. 146 Gibbs, Parish, and
Weedon stated that the presumption existed, but limited the consequence of
the presumption to requiring the opponent to introduce evidence contesting
capacity. Fields did not discuss the presumption at all.
Thus, prior to Kiddell, twenty-nine Supreme Court of Virginia cases discussed the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation; eight placed
the burden of proof upon the opponent, and 21 placed the burden on the
proponent. Of the eight opponent-burden cases, five stated that rule as a
matter of law, 147 and three stated it as a consequence of the presumption of
testamentary capacity. 148 Of the twenty-one cases that placed the burden of
proof upon the proponent, eight did not mention any presumption, 149 seven
indicated that a presumption of testamentary capacity existed, but it is a

42

1 Gibbs v. Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499, 501 (Va. 1990) ("Instruction 6 placed a burden of persuasion on the

[opponents] to prove testamentary incapacity. The instruction also required the [opponents] to establish
testamentary incapacity by clear and convincing evidence . . . . To show incapacity, the [opponents]
need only go forward with evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity.").
143Fields v. Fields, 499 S.E.2d 826, 828 (Va. 1998) ("The proponents of the ... will had the burden of
proving the existence of that degree of mental competence required for the valid execution of a will by a
preponderance of the evidence and retained that burden throughout the proceeding." (citing Gibbs, 387
S.E.2d at 500)).
'" Parish v. Parish, 704 S.E.2d 99, 104 (Va. 2011) ("[I]n the absence of a presumption of incapacity,
'the proponent of the will bears the burden of proving the existence of testamentary capacity by a preponderance of evidence and retains that burden throughout the proceeding. "' (citing Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d
at 500)). The court also held that "[t]he mere fact that one is under a conservatorship is not an adjudication of insanity and does not create a presumption of incapacity." However, if there is an adjudication of
insanity, "clear and convincing proof of capacity [is required] to overcome a presumption of insanity
when the testator previously was adjudicated insane."). Id at 103 (citing Wininger, 83 S.E.2d at 453).
145Weedon v. Weedon, 720 S.E.2d 552, 558 (Va. 2012) ("The proponent of a will bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the testatrix executed her will she possessed
testamentary capacity . . . .").
146See supra notes 142-45.
'47 Tabb v. Willis, 156 S.E. 556 (Va. 1931); Smith v. Ottley, 132 S.E. 512 (Va. 1926); Wooddy v. Taylor, 77 S.E. 498 (Va. 1913); Burton v. Scott, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 399 (1825); Spencer v. Moore, 8 Va. (4
Call) 423 (1798); see infra Sections IA.l, II.A.
148 Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151 (Va. 1950); Wallen v. Wallen, 57 S.E. 596 (Va. 1907); Temple v.

Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476 (1807); see infra Sections II.A.1, II.A.3.
14' Fields v. Fields, 499 S.E.2d 826 (Va. 1998); Walton v. Walton, 191 S.E. 768 (Va. 1937); Lester v.
Simpkins, 83 S.E. 1062 (Va. 1915); Gray v. Rumrill, 44 S.E. 697 (Va. 1903); Chappell v. Trent, 19 S.E.
314 (Va. 1893); Tucker v. Sandidge, 8 S.E. 650 (1888); Riddell v. Johnson's Ex'r, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.)
152 (1875); Coalter's Ex'rv. Bryan, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 18 (1844); see infra Sections II.A.1-3.
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mere evidentiary presumption not told to the jury, 1so and six indicated that
the presumption existed and formed part of the jury instructions. "I
When Kiddell considered the burden of proof in testamentary capacity, it
found five of the twenty-nine cases, 15 2 all of which, according to the court,
supported its decision, but one of which did not.153 The court did not discuss
the other twenty-four cases, twenty-two of which did not support its decision.
In summary, regarding the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation, before Kiddell, eleven reversals in the party bearing the burden of
proof occurred: Spencer through Burton [opponent burden], Bryan through
Gray [proponent]; Wallen [opponent]; Hopkins [proponent]; Wooddy [opponent]; Huff through Rust [proponent]; Ottley [opponent]; Green through
Culpepper [proponent]; Tabb [opponent]; Dickens through Croft [propo-

nent]; Tate [opponent]; Gibbs through Weedon [proponent].
Here is a Table summarizing the discussion in this section. It demonstrates three points: (1) the eleven reversals before Kiddell in the party bearing the burden of proof; (2) the convolutions in whether a presumption of
testamentary capacity exists and its consequence (which is considered in
greater detail in the next section); and (3) the failure to find and discuss, and
then apply, reject, revise, or reverse precedent.

' Weedon, 720 S.E.2d 552; Parish v. Parish, 704 S.E.2d 99 (Va. 2011); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499
(Va. 1990); Croft v. Snidow, 33 S.E.2d 208 (Va. 1945); Hall v. Hall, 23 S.E.2d 810 (Va. 1943); Redford
v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879 (Va. 1936); Dickens v. Bonnewell, 168 S.E. 610 (Va. 1933); see infra Sections
II.A.2-3.
1' Culpepper v. Robie, 154 S.E. 687 (Va. 1930); Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251 (Va. 1929); Green v.
Green's Ex'rs, 143 S.E. 683 (Va. 1928); Rust v. Reid, 97 S.E. 324 (Va. 1918); Huffy. Welch, 78 S.E.
573 (Va. 1913); Hopkins v. Wampler, 62 S.E. 926 (Va. 1908); see infra Sections II.A.2-3.
152 Tate, 57 S.E.2d 151; Trice, 147 S.E. 251; Rust, 97 S.E. 324; Huff, 78 S.E. 573; Hopkins, 62 S.E. 926;
see infra Sections II.A.2-3.
' Tate, 57 S.E.2d 151; see infra Sections II.A.2-3.
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4. Table Summarizing the Burden-of-Proof Cases
TABLE OF VIRGINIA CASES ADDRESSING BURDENS OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
IN TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY CASES

Opponent

Proponent

Virginia Cases

Burden

Burden

Discussed for

Cases

Cases

Burden-of-Proof

Presumption
Type

Spencerl5 4 (1798)

RL

Temple 5 5 (1807)

SB

Burtonl5 6 (1825)

RL

Bryan1

7

(1844)

NM

Riddell"ss (1875)

Tucker 5 9 (1888)

NM

Riddell

Chappell 60 (1893)

Gray 6 1 (1903)

NM

NM

Tucker, Chappell

NM

154See infra Section H.A. 1; supra note 55 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 54, 57,

69.
156See infra Section II.A.1; supra note 56 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 54, 69.
156See

infra Section II.A.1; supra note 52 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 54, 69.
infra Section HAl ; supra note 71 and accompanying text, text accompanying note 70, and text
following note 80.
15 See infra Section II.A.1; supra note 70 and accompanying text, and text following note 80.
' See infra Section II.A. 1; supra note 72 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 73-76.
160See infra Section H.A. 1; supra note 73 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 72, 7476.
161See infra Section H.A.1; supra note 74 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 72-73,
75-76.
157See
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Virginia Cases

Burden

Burden

Discussed for

Cases

Cases
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Presumption
Type

Wallenl6 2 (1907)

Temple

SB

Burton, Temple,
Hopkins16 3 (1908)

JI
Wallen

Wooddy1" (1913)

Temple

Huff 65 (1913)

Lester 's Ex 'r

RL

JI

66

NM
(1915)

Burton, Wallen,
Rust

67

(1918)

JI
Hopkins

Ottley1 68 (1926)

Temple, Wooddy

Green

69

(1928)

Trice170 (1929)

RL

JI

Huff, Rust

JI

162See infra Section II.A.1; supra note 77 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 78-80.
163See infra
Section II.A.2; supra note 83 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 88-92.
'" See infra
Section II.A.3; supra note 105 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 104.
165See infra Section II.A.3; supra note 106 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 107-

08.
166See

infra Section II.A.3; supra note 109 and accompanying text.

167See infra Section II.A.3; supra note 110 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 111-

12.
168See
169See

supra note 114.
supra note 116.
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Opponent

Proponent

Virginia Cases

Burden

Burden

Discussed for

Cases

Cases

Burden-of-Proof

Presumption
Type

Culpepper171 (1930)

Tabb (193 1)172

JI

Ottley, Temple, Huff

RL

Bryan, Wallen,
Dickens173 (1933)

EP
Hopkins

Redford1 74 (1936)

Dickens, Tabb

EP

Walton1 75 (1937)

Dickens

EP

Hall1 76 (1943)

Redford, Rust

NM

Croft177 (1945)

Redford

EP

Tate (1950)178

SB

Ottley, Rust, SpenGibbs 179 (1990)

EP
cer

170See

supra note
supra note
172See supra note
171See supra note
174See supra note
175See supra note
176See supra note
177See supra note
171See supra note
171See supra note
171See

117.
118.
120.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
133.
142.
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Opponent

Proponent

Virginia Cases

Burden

Burden

Discussed for

Cases

Cases

Burden-of-Proof

Fields"so (1998)

Gibbs, Wooddy

NM

Parish"' (2011)

Gibbs

EP

8
Weedonl 2 (2012)

Gibbs

EP

[Vol. XVIII:ii

Presumption
Type

Hopkins, Huff, Rust,
Kiddelll8 3 (2012)

JI
Trice, Tate

Key to Presumption Types:
RL = the presumption is used as rationale to create a rule of law always placing the burden of proof upon the opponent.
SB = when operative by proof of the basic fact, the presumption expressly shifts the burden to the opponent.
NM = a presumption of consequence to the burden of proof is not mentioned in the opinion.
JI= the presumption is included in the jury instructions.
EP = when operative by proof of the basic fact, the presumption is an evidentiary presumption that only gives rise
to a burden of production upon the opponent, and is not part of the jury instructions.
Bold = when the rule of the citing case directly opposes the rule of the cited case.

"' See supra note 143.
...
See supra note 144.
182See supra note 145.
..
3 The burden-of-proof rule of Kiddell is considered at some length in section III.C. See infra Section
III.C. That analysis concludes that Kiddell should be regarded as having shifted the burden of proof to
the opponent. See also Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E. 2d. 622, 628-31 (Va. 2012).
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B. Citing Inapposite Cases
In the 1950s, when a later, third, Supreme Court of Virginia opinion concluded that an earlier, second opinion had improperly interpreted an even
earlier, first opinion because the first opinion did not support the proposition for which the second opinion cited the first opinion, the court has said
the following in the third opinion: "but the quotation from [the first opinion
in the second opinion] appears rather to confuse than clarify."184 That statement by the court was a quote from Judge Brockenbrough Lamb's Virginia Probate Practice treatise discussing cases deciding whether testamentary character must appear from the face of a writing offered as a will.' It
could equally apply to cases stating the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation.
The table above identifies erroneous citations in bold text, when the rule
of the citing case directly opposes the rule of the cited case.
Perhaps even more strangely, the Supreme Court of Virginia has cited
the same case in support of opposite rules. Kiddell (2012) quoted Huff8 6 to
support Kiddell's claim that "burden of proof is upon those offering a will
for probate to show testamentary capacity on the part of the testator," 117 yet
Tabb (1931) cited Huff for the opposite rule: "those who would impeach a
will on the ground that the decedent had become incompetent must clearly
prove that incompetency to exist."SS Tabb is missing from Kiddell's discus-

sion and from its citation of cases, although Tabb was decided in the middle
of those cases string-cited in Kiddell.18 9

184Poindexter v. Jones, 106 S.E.2d 144, 147 (Va. 1958) (quoting BROCKENBROUGH LAMB, VIRGINIA
PROBATE PRACTICE § 33, at 68 (1957)).
15 LAMB, supra note 184, at 68.
186Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573 (Va. 1913).

I17Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 629 (quoting Huff, 78 S.E. at 575, 578).
...
Tabb v. Willis, 155 S.E. 556, 564 (Va. 1931) (citing Huff, 78 S. E. at 573).
' Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 629-30. To support placing the burden of proof upon those alleging testamentary incapacity, i.e., the opponents of the will, Tabb cites six cases, dating from 1807 to 1926. Tabb, 155
S.E. at 564 (citing Smith v. Ottley, 132 S.E. 512 (Va. 1926); Portner v. Portner, 112 S.E. 762 (Va.
1922); Huff, 78 S.E. 573; Parramore v. Taylor, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 220 (1854); Kachline v. Clark, 4
Whart. (Pa.) 320 (1839); Temple v. Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476 (1807)).
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III. THE EVIDENTIARY PRESUMPTION ARISING UPON PROOF OF DUE
EXECUTION

A. Evidentiary Presumptions in General
A detailed analysis of Kiddell first requires a pr6cis on evidentiary presumptions. The term "presumption" refers to three separate processes: (1)
inferences; (2) rebuttable presumptions; and (3) conclusive presumptions. 190
"The similarity between three importantly distinct processes has led to
some confusion, as is usually the case when a single term is used in the law
in more than one sense."91 All three processes concern the relation between

one fact, sometimes called the "first fact" or the "basic fact," and another
fact, sometimes called the "second fact" or the "presumed fact."19 2
With an inference, when the first fact is proven, "the jury is permitted or
authorized to find the existence of the second fact, but is not compelled to
do so, even if no evidence on the point is offered by the opposition." 19 3 With
a conclusive presumption, "when the first fact is proven, the second fact
must be found to exist, and no evidence of its nonexistence is admissible."194
The rebuttable presumption exists as a category between the inference,
which is permissive, and the conclusive presumption, which is mandatory.
Under a rebuttable presumption, when the first fact is proven, the jury must
accept the second fact "only if no sufficient evidence is offered by the opponent to rebut the existence of the second fact." 195 "[R]ebuttable presumptions are the only true presumptions, and it should be borne in mind that
proof of the first fact compels the trier of fact to find that the second fact exists if no adequate evidence is offered to disprove or rebut the existence of

the second fact."196

190CHARLES E. FRIEND & KENT SINCLAIR, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 4-1, at 211 (7th ed.
2012) [hereinafter FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012].
' Id. 4-1[a], at211-12.
192City of Hopewell v. Tirpak, 502 S.E.2d 161, 168 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("A presumption is a procedural rule of law 'directing that if a party proves certain facts (the "basic facts") at a trial or hearing, the
factfinder must also accept an additional fact (the "presumed fact") as proven unless sufficient evidence
is introduced tending to rebut the presumed fact." (citing 1 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 4:2 (7th ed. 1992)).
' FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, 4-1 [a], at 212 (emphasis omitted).
194FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 4-1 [b], at 212 (emphasis omitted).
'9 FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 4-1 [c], at 213.
'96FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 4-1[c], at 213 (citing Martin v. Phillips, 369 S.E.2d 397
(Va. 1988)).
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Rebuttable presumptions affect only the burden of producing evidence,
and not the burden of proof. The "burden of producing evidence .

.

. fre-

quently passes from party to party during the progress of a trial, but the necessity of proving his case [the burden of proof] always rests upon the
plaintiff and never shifts."197
Kiddell reminded the bench and bar that rebuttable presumptions bifurcate into persistent and bursting presumptions. Kiddell held "that the presumption of testamentary capacity does not disappear, unless . . ." the trial

court rules that the presumption was rebutted as a matter of law because "no
rational fact finder could find that the presumption had not been rebutted." 198
B. Problems with the General Virginia Law of Presumptions
Professors Friend and Sinclair, in the latest update to their Evidence in
Virginia treatise, tell us that Kiddell is a significant event in the law of evidence. "The Supreme Court of Virginia's sharply divided opinion in Kiddell
v. Labowitz, a case about the presumption of testamentary capacity . . .,

leaves important issues to be worked out in Virginia practice with respect to
all of the other presumptions recognized in the Commonwealth."199
When searching Supreme Court of Virginia opinions to divide rebuttable
presumptions into bursting and persistent types, other problems will surface; Professors Friend and Sinclair describe them. Terminology is imprecise, regarding the word "presumption" 200 and the phrase "primafacie evidence." 20 1 Holdings are inconsistent on questions about whether an
inference or presumption can be based upon another inference or presump-

'" Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 883 (Va. 1936).
'" Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622, 630-31 (Va. 2012).
' CHARLES E. FRIEND & KENT SINCLAIR, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 4-5, at 7 (7th ed.

Supp. 2013) [hereinafter FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2013] (emphasis added).
200FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 4-1, at 211-12 ("The term presumption is used to describe at least three different processes incident to a trial. . . . The similarity between three importantly
distinct processes has led to some confusion, as is usually the case when a single term is used in the law
in more than one sense.").
201 FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 4-4, at 218 ("The term 'prima facie evidence' is also
frequently used in the appellate cases. Where it is defined in the cases, the definitions sometimes suggest
that 'prima facie evidence' creates an inference rather than a true presumption, but other formulations
indicate that it establishes a rebuttable presumption. Because of this duality of definition, it is usually
necessary to look at the effect given to the evidence in a particular case to determine how the term is
being used.").
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tion. 202 When describing how so to divide rebuttable presumptions, Professors Friend and Sinclair make these observations.
From the foregoing, only two conclusions can safely be reached:
1. Virginia courts often do instruct juries on true [rebuttable] presumptions,
even when rebutted, and
2. The assistance of the Supreme Court is needed in clarifying the propriety of
this practice.
Whether such instructions are correct or not-and there are good arguments both
203
pro and con-the situation is, as the old saying goes, "not a model of clarity."

At present, Kiddell provides the latest rules for clarifying the practice of
instructing juries on a particular rebuttable presumption: the presumption of
testamentary capacity.
C. The Persisting Rebuttable Presumption of Testamentary Capacity;
Kiddell v. Labowitz Analyzed
In Kiddell,204 beneficiaries under an earlier will contested a later, second
writing, offered as a will, for lack of testamentary capacity. 205 After the
close of all of the evidence, the opponents moved to strike the evidence of
the proponent of the second writing, contending that the proponent's evidence was insufficient to prove that the decedent possessed testamentary
capacity when she executed the second writing. 206 The trial court denied the
opponents' motion, allowed the case to go to the jury, and instructed the jury, over the opponents' objection about the presumption of testamentary capacity and the consequences of its operation. 207 Opponents appealed, contending error (1) in instructing the jury about the presumption and (2) in
denying opponents' motion to strike the evidence .208

202FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 4-3, at 217.
203FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 4-6, at 225.

Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622 (Va. 2012). Among the other problems in the Kiddell opinion,
the Supreme Court of Virginia misstated the rules for due execution of a will. The court stated, "[The
drafting lawyer] and one of the paralegals from his office witnessed the testator's execution of her will,
and the other paralegal served as the notary public in accordance with the provisions of Code § 64.149." Id. at 625. Section 64.149, now 64.2-403, states the elements requisite for constituting a writing as
a will. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-403 (Repl. Vol. 2012). A notary is not required. By contrast, sections
64.2-452 and 64.2453 address another subject, how to make a will self-proving, and that requires a notary. §§ 64.2-452 to -453.
205 Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 624-25.
206Id. at 626.
204

207 id.

Id. at 627 ("We awarded [opponent] this appeal on two issues: (1) whether the [trial] court erred by
granting Instructions 8 and 9 [Instruction 8 was the presumption instruction and Instruction 9 was the
finding instruction]; and (2) whether the [trial] court erred by denying [opponent's] motion to strike the
208
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The Supreme Court of Virginia's decision consisted of three opinions.
All seven Justices agreed that the trial court did not err in denying the opponents' motion to strike the proponent's evidence. 209 Justice Powell wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Justices Goodwyn and Millette, which also
found that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury about the presumption of testamentary capacity. 210 Justice McClanahan agreed that the
jury should be instructed about the presumption of testamentary capacity,
but would not reach one point that the majority had addressed. 211 Chief Justice Kinser wrote an opinion, joined by Justices Lemons and Mims, which
concluded that the jury should not have been instructed about the presumption of testamentary capacity. 212
The rationale for the majority's decision to instruct the jury about the
presumption of testamentary capacity is difficult to discern, but two possibilities exist: (1) the point stability of equipoise (under which rationale all
rebuttable presumptions become persistent), and (2) precedent, existing and
not overruled, but not readily remembered, that made the testamentary capacity presumption persistent, rather than bursting (under which rationale
only certain, previously identified rebuttable presumptions are persistent).
1. The Point Stability of Equipoise
In the concluding paragraph of the presumption analysis section of the
Kiddell majority opinion, the court wrote as follows.
When the proponent of a will enjoys the presumption of testamentary capacity,
the jury must be instructed as to this presumption. Where the evidence is in equipoise, the presumption comes to the proponent's rescue, allowing him to prevail. Indeed, if the jury is not advised of the presumption, the proponent is de-

evidence.").
209 Justice Powell's majority opinion concluded that a conflict existed in the testimony about
testamentary capacity, thereby making testamentary capacity a jury issue, and forming the basis for the trial
court's properly denying the motion to strike. Id. at 632. Justice Kinser, joined by Justices Lemons and
Mims, summarily agreed. Id. at 633 n.2 ("I concur with part II, section B. of the majority opinion and
agree that the [trial] court did not err by denying the opponents' motion to strike the evidence.") (Kinser,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). So did Justice McClanahan. Id. at 637 ("I agree with the
majority's holding that the [trial] court did not err in ... refusing to grant [opponents'] motion to strike
[proponent's] evidence.") (McClanahan, J., concurring).
210 Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 624.
211 Id.at 637 ("I agree with the majority's holding that the [trial] court did not err in granting
Instructions
8 and 9 . . . I write separately because I believe it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity as a matter of law
because [opponent] did not move the [trial] court for such a determination.") (McClanahan, J., concurring).
212 Id. at 637 ("I conclude that the [trial] court erred by giving Instructions 8 and 9.") (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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prived of this benefit and, in the face of equal evidence, would be found to have
not carried his burden even though the law is otherwise. For this reason, we
hold that the presumption of testamentary capacity does not disappear, unless
the [trial] court rules that the presumption was rebutted as a matter of law because no rational fact finder could find that the presumption had not been rebutted. In this case, the [trial] court did not err in instructing the jury as to the ex213
istence of the presumption.

As noted above, the Supreme Court of Virginia used "equipoise" to refer
to a condition of equal evidence. In that circumstance, according to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the jury should apply the presumption and find the
presumed fact to have been proven. 214 And, if the jury has not been instructed about the presumption, then, when equipoise exists, the jury obviously
cannot apply the presumption, so the jury then would be forced to find
against the party bearing the burden of proof, and the party bearing the burden of proof can be different from the party against whom the presumption
operates.
But under the equipoise rationale, the jury needs to know about all presumptions, because the possibility of equipoise exists whenever the party
bearing the burden of proof differs from the party against whom the presumption operates. 215 But, as Justice Kinser noted, although the sole rationale given by the majority, when stating its holding, was the equipoise
rationale, the jury instructions in Kiddell "did not tell the jury that if the evidence is in equipoise, the presumption tips the scales in favor of [proponent] and permits a finding that he proved testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the evidence." 216 That failure in reasoning between the
rationale and holding of the Kiddell majority opinion is manifest, and thus
apt to mislead. As Justice Kinser stated, "[t]hus, using the majority's rationale, the [trial] court erred by giving Instructions [about the presumption
of testamentary capacity]. But, the majority does not so hold. Consequently,
trial courts in the future will not know whether to instruct a jury in a will

Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
Id. at 633.
215Professors Friend and Sinclair, discuss the plain conflict of Kiddell and Kavanaugh v. Wheeling, 7
S.E.2d 125 (1940). "[T]he Court had said in Kavanaugh that in Virginia a presumption 'cannot stand in
the face of positive facts to the contrary.' Because a presumption simply creates a hypothesis, 'if the
presumption thus created is rebutted or overcome by substantial evidence showing the true facts to be to
the contrary, the presumption disappears. Presumptions give way to ascertained or established facts.'
This language leaves a very important question: does a presumption disappear where the opponent can
produce at least 'some' positive evidence of what happened on the occasion in question, or does it only
disappear if the opponent proves conclusively that the presumed fact is not correct.... [I]t is not clear
how the Court today, under Kiddell, will read the [Kavanaugh] requirement of offering 'ascertained or
established facts' to rebut a presumption and cause it to disappear." FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2013, supra
note 199, § 4-5 at 8.
216Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 635 (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213

214
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contest using instructions like those in our prior cases or instructions similar
to [those in Kiddell] ."217
The Kiddell majority stated that there is one circumstance in which the
jury will not be told about the presumption of testamentary capacity: when
the trial court finds that the presumption was rebutted "as a matter of law
because no rational fact finder could find that the presumption had not been
rebutted." 2 18 But of course, as Justice Kinser noted, in such a situation, no
jury instructions ever will be made, because the trial court should direct a
verdict in favor of the opponent-the party against whom the presumption
operated. 219
Here is an example. Proponents of a will prove due execution, giving rise
to a presumption of testamentary capacity operating against opponents, but
opponents introduce evidence of sufficient quantity and quality that the trial
judge decides "as a matter of law [that] no rational fact finder could find
that the presumption [of testamentary capacity] had not been rebutted." 220
Well, if no rational jury could decide that a presumption [in favor of testamentary capacity] had not been rebutted, how could that jury rationally decide that testamentary capacity had been shown? Or, dropping all the negatives in that sentence: If the evidence shows to the trial court that the only
rational decision a jury could make is that the opponent has rebutted testamentary capacity, then how could the same jury rationally find that the proponents had proven testamentary capacity? If the negation of testamentary
capacity is established so thoroughly that it exists as a matter of law to destroy a presumption, how then can the presence of testamentary capacity rationally be found to predominate when applying the burden of proof?
The only way out of that conundrum is if the standard for rebutting the
presumption ("sufficient evidence") is different from the standard of proof
("greater weight of the evidence"), and, under Kiddell's definitions, there
appears no meaningful difference between them. 221

Id.
Id. at 631.
219 Id. at 633 ("Moreover, a finding that the opponent of a will has proven testamentary incapacity as a
matter of law means that no rational fact finder could find the existence of testamentary capacity when
the will was executed and judgment must therefore be entered in favor of the opponent.").
220See id. at 631.
221 See infra Section III.D.2.
217

218
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2. The Larger Evidentiary Quandary
The larger evidentiary quandary after Kiddell is the extent of the persistence (or bursting) of other presumptions, and this is the matter upon which
Professors Friend and Sinclair have written.
[T]he Court had said in Kavanaugh that in Virginia a presumption "cannot
stand in the face of positive facts to the contrary." Because a presumption simply creates a hypothesis, "if the presumption thus created is rebutted or overcome by substantial evidence showing the true facts to be to the contrary, the
presumption disappears. Presumptions give way to ascertained or established
facts." This language leaves a very important question: does a presumption disappear where the opponent can produce at least "some" positive evidence of
what happened on the occasion in question, or does it only disappear if the opponent proves conclusively that the presumed fact is not correct. . . . [I]t is not
clear how the Court today, under Kiddell, will read the [Kavanaugh] requirement of offering "ascertained or established facts" to rebut a presumption and
cause it to disappear. 222

As noted, two possibilities exist for the holding in Kiddell: (1) the point
stability of equipoise (under which rationale all rebuttable presumptions become persistent), and (2) precedent, existing and not overruled, but not
readily remembered, that made the testamentary capacity presumption persistent, rather than bursting (under which rationale only certain, previously
identified rebuttable presumptions are persistent). If the point-stability-ofequipoise holding controls, all presumptions in Virginia become the subject
of jury instruction. If the controlling precedent holding controls, then all of
the Supreme Court of Virginia's precedent about any given presumption
must be surveyed to determine whether that presumption persists for instruction to the jury, or bursts upon introduction of evidence sufficient in
the trial judge's mind to create a jury question. 223
When the Kiddell court stated its holding, it recited only the equipoise rationale. 2 24 However, earlier in the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia
stated that, as a general rule, presumptions in Virginia burst. "As Kiddell
correctly argues, in most contexts in Virginia, a presumption disappears
when the presumption is rebutted as a matter of law. However, Kiddell's
contention that the presumption of testamentary capacity disappears in the

222FRiEND & SINCLAIR 2013, supra note 199, § 4-5, at 8.
223 FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, §4-8, at 227 ("Where the presumption merely
shifts the
burden of going forward, however, it would appear that the presumption is rebutted (i.e., disappears)
when the opponent has introduced enough evidence to justify the jury in finding the nonexistence of the
presumed fact-i.e., enough evidence to create a jury question as to whether Fact Two exists. Thereafter,
the case proceeds 'exactly as if no presumption had ever been applicable in the action"').
224See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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face of any evidence presented to the contrary is incorrect." 225 Thus, although Kiddell's most limited statement of its holding exclusively relies upon the equipoise rationale, Kiddell's discussion of Kavanaugh challenges
that exclusivity. All rebuttable presumptions operating against the party not
bearing the burden of proof (or, removing the negatives, all rebuttable presumptions operating in favor of the party bearing the burden of proof) present the equipoise problem, and if Kiddell makes all of them persistent, then
Kiddell would have reversed the general rule of Kavanaugh that it ostensibly affirmed.
To retain Kavanaugh's general rule, we must read Kiddell as adopting
the second rationale. Under that second rationale, Virginia presumptions
burst generally, but exceptions exist for certain presumptions previously
identified by common law, and the presumption of testamentary capacity is
such an exception, because "as early as 1908, th[e] [Virginia Supreme]
Court addressed the propriety of advising the jury of the presumption in
will contests and allowing them to consider it."226
The next issue to consider is whether the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Kiddell was correct in asserting that Virginia common law previously had identified the presumption of testamentary capacity as an exceptional presumption that persists for instruction to the jury.
3. Precedent Unique to Testamentary Capacity Litigation
To support its holding that the presumption of testamentary capacity is a
persistent rebuttable presumption, i.e., the type of presumption that is told
to the jury, the Kiddell majority cited Hopkins (1908); Huff (1913); Rust
(1918); Trice (1929); and Tate (1950). 227
As noted earlier, Hopkins in 1908 (and Wallen in 1907) turned back the
high water mark of evidentiary pressure on the proponent. 228 In particular,

Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622, 630 (Va. 2012) (citing Kavanaugh v. Wheeling, 7 S.E.2d 125,
128 (Va. 1940)).
226Id. at 628. Accepting that second rationale of Kiddell would make the scheme for deciding whether a
particular Virginia rebuttable presumption persists similar with the scheme for deciding whether a particular Virginia rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of proof. Under Rule 2:302, "[u]nless otherwise
provided by Virginia common law or statute, in a civil action a rebuttable presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof." VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:301 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
227 Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 628, 629 (citing Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151, 160-61 (Va. 1950); Jenkins
v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251, 260 (Va. 1929); Rust v. Reid, 97 S.E. 324, 331 (Va. 1918); Huff v. Welch, 78
S.E. 573, 575, 578 (Va. 1913); Hopkins v. Wampler, 62 S.E. 926, 927-28 (Va. 1908)).
225

228See infra Section II.A.2.
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Hopkins reversed a verdict against a will for two errors in jury instructions:
(1) improperly requiring that a proponent prove testamentary capacity by
clear and convincing evidence, 229 and (2) omitting the "presumption of sanity." Regarding the "presumption of sanity," the Supreme Court of Virginia
wrote, "[w]e conclude on that branch of the case (testatrix's sanity having
been drawn in question), that the burden of proving her sanity at the time of
the execution of the alleged will to the satisfaction of the jury rested upon
the [proponents]; and in determining that question the jury should also have
taken into considerationthe presumption in favor of testatrix's sanity." 230
The Hopkins court did not describe how the presumption was to be taken
into consideration, nor did the decision condition operation of the presumption upon proof of due execution.
In Huff (1913), the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict against a will because there had been a "plain and
palpable deviation from the proof, [so] interference on the part of the appellate court is warranted." 231 In a portion of the opinion headed "Statement,"
the Supreme Court of Virginia reprinted five pages of jury instructions. 232 In
the opinion, the Court did not discuss the jury instructions other than to
write, "[t]he instructions given by the court, all of which appear in the
statement preceding this opinion, were ample to submit to the jury fully and
fairly the case which the evidence adduced tended to prove, and we are,
therefore, of opinion that the court committed no reversible error in its rulings with respect to the instructions refused or to those given."233
The only instruction in Huff addressing burdens of proof or presumptions
in proving testamentary capacity was Instruction 0, which provided as follows.
While the burden of proof is upon those offering a will for probate, to show testamentary capacity on the part of the testator at the time the will was executed
to the satisfaction of the jury, yet the court tells the jury that there is in all cases
an existing presumption in favor of the testator's sanity and capacity, which is
to be taken into considerationby the jury in determining the question of com2 34
petency.

The only point in Huff relevant to Kiddell is Instruction 0; therefore, the
Kiddell majority's citation of Huff necessarily interprets Huff as approving

Hopkins, 62 S.E. at 927-28.
added).
231 Huff, 78 S.E. at 579.
232 Id. at 574-76.
233 Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
234Id. at 575 (quoting Instruction 0) (emphasis added).
229

230Id. (emphasis
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Instruction 0, yet other decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia discount
the precedential value of such blanket approvals of jury instructions. 23 5 Note
that Instruction 0 simply recites the language of Hopkins; therefore, neither
Huff nor Hopkins describe how the presumption is to be taken into consideration by the jury, and Huff and Hopkins do not condition operation of the
presumption upon proof of due execution.
In Rust,23 6 (1918) the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed a trial court
judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of a will because two jurors,
who had had business dealings with the testator, should not have been empanelled on the jury. 23 7 In addition, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Rust
analyzed and specifically approved a jury instruction identical to Huff s Instruction 0,238 about which Huff had given only blanket approval. 23 9
About ten years later, in Trice240 (1929), the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed a trial court judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of a will
against a challenge for lack of testamentary capacity.241 The Supreme Court
of Virginia reviewed forty-three jury instructions and the objections to
them, which "covered more than seventy-five pages of [opponents']
briefs. 242 One of the instructions approved in Trice was identical to the jury
instruction in Huff and Rust, except for the addition of the word "and" to

235Decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia after Tate are inconsistent about the precedential value of

Tate's approval of the instructions. In Gibbs (1990), the Supreme Court of Virginia said that the propriety of instructions was not at issue in Tate, so that it wasn't error for the trial court in Gibbs not to give an
instruction, based on Tate, that the jury "should consider" the pendency of committal proceedings when
the putative will was executed. Gibbs v. Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499, 501 (Va. 1990). However, in Kiddell,
when discussing the jury instructions, Tate is quoted. Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622, 629-30 (Va.
2012).
236 Rust v. Reid, 97 S.E. 324 (Va.
1918).
237 In Rust, the case "should not have been submitted to the determination of jurors who
had made up
and expressed opinions on the subject from their intimate acquaintance and business relations with the
testator." Id. at 330. Two jurors had "had business transactions with [the testator], one of them renting
his property and the other 'had transactions with him in the store, selling him goods,' thereby in the most
positive way affirming his capacity to contract. They would have placed themselves in a very awkward
position to affirm by their verdict that he did not have the capacity to make a will." Id. at 329-30.
238Id. at 331 (quoting Instruction 3). Strangely, that jury instruction did not mimic the law as discussed
earlier in the opinion. The Supreme Court of Virginia discussed the law as follows. "The burden of
proving testamentary capacity is on the [proponent] of the will, and continues upon him throughout any
contest on that question; but when he has shown a compliance with all the statutory requirements for the
due execution of a will, the legal presumption of sanity comes to his relief, and dispenses with any evidence to the contrary. The proof of due execution, therefore, entitles the [proponent] prima facie to have
the will admitted to probate." Id.
239 See Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573, 578 (Va. 1913).
240 Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251 (Va. 1929).
241 Id.
242Id. at 262.
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begin the Trice instruction.243 The Supreme Court of Virginia's analysis in
Trice consisted merely of stating, "[the instruction] was approved in Huff
and in Rust."2 44 Thus the Huff, Rust, and Trice decisions all approved an
identical instruction; it places the burden of proof upon the proponent and
tells the jury to take the presumption of testamentary capacity into consideration when deciding if the proponent has met that burden.
In Tate245 (1950) the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed a trial court
judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of a will executed by an individual who had been adjudged insane prior to executing it.246 Two writings
were offered as wills; one made in 1915 and another in 1916.247 Between the
execution of the two writings, Tate had been "adjudged to be insane" by a
"lunacy commission" in a "committal proceeding." 248 The jury was required
to consider whether neither, either, or both of the 1915 and 1916 writings
constituted a will, and the jury returned a verdict that the 1916 writing was
the testator's valid last will.249
Because the testator had been adjudicated insane during the time between
the execution of the 1915 and 1916 writings, two presumptions of capacity
existed in the case, one in favor of capacity for the 1915 writing and one
against capacity for the 1916 writing. The jury was instructed (1) that a presumption of capacity existed for the 1915 writing; (2) that for the 1915 writing, the jury "should consider" the "committal proceedings" commenced
seven months later; and (3) that for the 1916 writing, a presumption of incapacity existed because testator had been adjudged insane. 25 0
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Tate expressly approved the following
instruction regarding the presumption in favor of capacity for the 1915 writing executed by the testator prior to her adjudication as insane.
And while the burden of proof is upon those offering a will for probate, to show
testamentary capacity on the part of the testatrix at the time the will was executed to the satisfaction of the jury, yet the court tells the jury that all persons

243Id. at 260 (quoting Instruction No. 4).
244Id. (citations omitted).
245
246

Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151 (Va. 1950).
Id.

247Id. at 153.
248Id. at 155.

Id. at 153-54.
250The court distinguished Gilmer v. Brown (1947), because the capacity proceeding there proceeded
under a statute different from the capacity proceeding in Tate. In Tate, the capacity proceeding was under Acts of 1910, ch. 102, which in 1950 was section 1017 of the Code of 1942 (but the court also cites
1050 of the Code of 1942 as the procedural section). In Gilmer, the action was under section 1080a of
the Code of 1942. Tate, 57 S.E.2d at 157-58.
249
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who have not been adjudged insane are presumed to be sane and capable of
making a will until the contrary is proved, and that this presumption is to be
taken into consideration by the jury in determining the question of competency.
251

Let us contrast the operative parts of (1) the instruction approved in Tate
and (2) the instruction approved in Huff, Rust, and Trice (the "H-R-T instruction"). Under the H-R-T instruction, the presumption of testamentary
capacity is to be "taken into consideration," without more direction. 2 52 Under the Tate instruction, the presumption of testamentary capacity governs
"until the contrary is proved." 253 In Tate, the presumption of testamentary
capacity was conditioned only on the testator's having not been adjudicated
insane. In the H-R-T instruction, the presumption of testamentary capacity
was subject to no condition for its operation; it exists in all cases. 254 That
difference arises because the testator in Tate had been adjudicated insane
prior to the execution of one of the writings at issue. Consequently, neither
the Tate nor H-R-T instructions condition the presumption of testamentary
capacity upon due execution. Under these approaches, the presumption exists in all cases, except the rare situation in which an adjudication of insanity occurred. And the Tate instruction tells the jury to shift the burden of
proof to the opponent if the testator has not been adjudicated insane.
For forty years after the Tate decision, which unambiguously had placed
the burden of proof on the opponent absent adjudication of insanity, 255 the
Supreme Court of Virginia did not decide any cases that addressed (1)

Id. at 160 (emphasis added) (quoting Instruction B). In Tate, the appellant argued that "the burden
imposed upon the proponents of the respective wills was not sufficiently observed during the trial or
clearly pointed out to the jury." Id. The court quoted the instructions, including Instruction B, and wrote,
"the character of proof incumbent upon the respective proponents was made evident to the jury." Id.
252 Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251, 260 (Va. 1929) (quoting Instruction No. 4); Rust v. Reid, 97 S.E. 324,
331 (Va. 1918) (quoting Instruction 3); Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573, 575 (Va. 1913) (quoting Instruction
0). ("[T]he court tells the jury that there is in all cases an existing presumption in favor of the testator's
sanity and capacity, which is to be taken into consideration by the jury in determining the question of
competency.").
253 Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151, 160 (Va. 1950) (quoting Instruction B) ("[T]he court tells the jury
that all persons who have not been adjudged insane are presumed to be sane and capable of making a
will untilthe contrary is proved, and that this presumption is to be taken into consideration by the jury in
determining the question of competency." (emphasis added). Note that the instruction says "until the
contrary"-lack of testamentary capacity-is proved, not "contested," "rebutted," "contradicted," or "introduced." Id.
254Jenkins, 147 S.E. at 260 (quoting Instruction No. 4); Rust, 97 S.E. at 331 (quoting Instruction 3);
Huff, 78 S.E. at 575 (quoting Instruction 0). "[T]he court tells the jury that there is in all cases an existing presumption in favor of the testator's sanity and capacity, which is to be taken into consideration by
the jury in determining the question of competency." Rust, 97 S.E. at 331; Huff, 78 S.E. at 575; see Jenkins, 147 S.E. at 260.
255 Tate, 57 S.E.2d 151. See generally Gibbs v. Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499 (Va. 1990) (addressing burden in
testamentary capacity challenge in 1990).
251
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which party bears the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation;
(2) whether, and how, a presumption of capacity exists; or (3) whether, and
how, the jury is instructed about that presumption. In 1990, the Gibbs decision reversed a trial court for improperly placing the burden of proof upon
the opponent, 25 6 and stated that the burden of proof was upon the proponent. 25 7 Gibbs discussed Tate, without addressing the clear conflict in the
decisions about which party bears the burden of proof. 258
Three subsequent cases, Fields25 9 (1998), Parish260 (2011), and Weedon 26 1
(2012), like Gibbs, placed the burden of proof upon proponents. However,
in Gibbs, Fields, Parish,and Weedon, the jury was not instructed about the
presumption of testamentary capacity. 262 Fields did not discuss the presumption at all. 263 Gibbs, Parish,and Weedon stated that the presumption existed,
but limited its consequence to requiring introduction by the opponent of ev-

Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d at 501 ("Instruction 6 placed a burden of persuasion on the [opponents] to prove
testamentary incapacity. The instruction also required the [opponents] to establish testamentary incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.... To show incapacity, the [opponents] need only go forward
with evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity."). The trial court also was
reversed for requiring the opponent to prove testamentary incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.
Id.
257 Id. (citing Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 883 (Va.
1936)).
258Id. at 501. The discussion of Tate in Gibbs was limited to whether the jury should be instructed to
consider an adjudication of incapacity made subsequent to the execution of a purported will. The opponents in Gibbs sought such an instruction, basing it on Tate. In Gibbs, the court stated, "Our consideration of the instruction in Tate was simply to demonstrate the distinction between the two wills at issue in
that case. The instruction was not at issue on appeal, and we did not pass on the propriety of the language used in that instruction. Therefore, the fact that similar instruction was given in Tate is not instructive in the instant case." Id.
259 Fields v. Fields, 499 S.E.2d 826, 828 (Va. 1998) ("The proponents of the ... will had the burden of
proving the existence of that degree of mental competence required for the valid execution of a will by a
preponderance of the evidence and retained that burden throughout the proceeding." (quoting Gibbs, 387
S.E.2d at 500).
260 Parish v. Parish, 704 S.E.2d 99, 104 (Va. 2011) ("[I]n the absence of a presumption
of incapacity,
'[t]he proponent of the will bears the burden of proving the existence of testamentary capacity by a preponderance of evidence and retains that burden throughout the proceeding."' (citing Gibbs, 239 Va. at
199, 387 S.E.2d at 500)). The court also held that the "mere fact that one is under a conservatorship is
not an adjudication of insanity and does not create a presumption of incapacity." Id. at 103. However, if
there is an adjudication of insanity, "clear and convincing proof of capacity [is required] to overcome a
presumption of insanity when the testator previously was adjudicated insane." Id. at 103 (citing W. State
Hosp. v. Wininger, 83 S.E.2d 446, 452-53 (Va. 1954)).
261 Weedon v. Weedon, 720 S.E.2d 552, 558 (Va. 2012) ("The proponent of a will bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the testatrix executed her will she possessed
testamentary capacity . . . .").
262 Cf. Weedon, 720 S.E.2d at 558; Parish,704 S.E.2d at 104; Fields, 499 S.E.2d at 826; Gibbs, 387
S.E.2d at 500-01 (citing the instructions given by the court and lack of discussion on the presumption of
testamentary capacity).
263Cf. Fields, 499 S.E.2d 826 (court does not discuss testamentary capacity).
256
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2 The Gibbs decision stated the following; both
idence contesting capacity.M
the Parish and Weedon decisions quoted it.
[T]he proponent of the will is entitled to a presumption that testamentary capacity existed by proving compliance with all statutory requirements for the valid
execution of the will. Once the presumption exists, the [opponent] then bears
the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome this presumption, alt265
hough the burden of persuasion remains with the proponent.

Therefore, in Gibbs, Parish, and Weedon, the presumption of testamentary capacity (1) was conditioned upon proof of due execution and (2) was a
bursting rebuttable presumption because it merely required the opponent to
"go forward" or "produce" evidence contradicting capacity. Those three
cases did not mention that the jury was instructed about the presumption,
and indeed any such instruction would be inconsistent with "going forward"
as the only consequence of the operation of the presumption of testamentary
capacity.
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided Kiddell, 11 months after
Weedon; the decision ignored how Gibbs, Parish, and Weedon had treated

the presumption of testamentary capacity. Instead, Kiddell claimed to remember the "exact" or "close variant" jury instruction of Huff, Rust, Trice,
and Tate, but of course Tate's instruction was markedly different.266 The
Tate instruction expressly shifted the burden of proof to the opponent, while
the Huff-Rust-Tate instruction (the "H-R-T instruction") merely told the jury
to take the presumption into consideration. Kiddell also ignored the Tate
difference, thereby treating the "exact" or "close variant" instruction as the
H-R-T instruction.
However, even if we treat the H-R-T instruction as the "exact same instruction or close variant" approved for a hundred years, 267 the Kiddell instructions did not reproduce the H-R-T instruction. The H-R-T instruction
told the jury to take the presumption of testamentary capacity "into consideration," without more direction. 2 68 The Kiddell instructions told the jury to

Weedon, 720 S.E.2d at 558 (citing Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d at 501); Parish, 704 S.E.2d at 104 (citing
Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d at 501); Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d at 501(citing Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 883 (Va.
1936)).
265 Weedon, 720 S.E.2d at 558 (citing Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d at 501); Parish, 704 S.E.2d at 104 (citing
Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d at 501); Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d at 501(citing Redford, 185 S.E. at 883).
266 Compare Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622, 629 (Va. 2012) with Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d
151, 160 (Va. 1950) ("[T]he court tells the jury that all persons who have not been adjudged insane are
presumed to be sane and capable of making a will until the contrary is proved, and that this presumption
is to be taken into consideration by the jury in determining the question of competency." (emphasis added) (quoting Instruction B)).
267 Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 629.
268 Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251, 260 (Va. 1929) (quoting Instruction No. 4); Rust v.
Reid, 97 S.E. 324,
264
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find for the proponent unless the opponent introduced "evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption of testamentary capacity." 269
The Kiddell opinion addressed the difference between the H-R-T and
Kiddell instructions, in footnote 4, yet found them functionally equivalent.
The jury in the instant case was specifically told to determine whether the opponents had presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity. In prior cases, the jury was told that they were to take "into consideration" the presumption of testamentary capacity when "determining the
question of competency." Telling the jury to take the presumption into consideration is the functional equivalent of instructing the jury to determine whether
the evidence was sufficiently rebutted. Indeed, this practice is not without precedent in will contest cases. With regard to lost wills, the Virginia Model Jury
Instructions inform the jury that there is a presumption that a will that was in
the possession of the decedent prior to his death but cannot be found after his
death was destroyed and "[t]o overcome this presumption the burden is on [the
proponent] to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [decedent] did not
27 0
revoke the will."

An analysis of the logical premises employed in footnote 4 will demonstrate that footnote 4's reasoning demands that all persistent rebuttable presumptions be treated as shifting the burden of proof upon the presumed fact.
Under the presumption of revocation, in the Model Jury Instruction, discussed in footnote 4, (1) the basic facts are (i) a will, (ii) last in the testator's possession, (iii) and not found after her death; (2) the presumed fact is
revocation; and (3) the burden to prove revocation, absent operation of the
presumption, rests upon the opponent. The Model Jury Instruction, discussed in footnote 4, states that when the basic facts of (i) a will, (ii) last in
testator's possession, and (iii) not found at her death are proven, the presumed fact of revocation exists, and "[t]o overcome this presumption the
burden is on [the proponent] to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
[decedent] did not revoke the will." 271 Therefore, when its presumption operates, the Model Jury Instruction on lost wills expressly shifts the burden
of proof on the fact of revocation from the opponent, who bears it absent
the presumption, to the proponent, who then must prove the lack of revocation.

331 (Va. 1918) (quoting Instruction 3); Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573, 575 (Va. 1913) (quoting Instruction
0). "[T]he court tells the jury that there is in all cases an existing presumption in favor of the testator's
sanity and capacity, which is to be taken into consideration by the jury in determining the question of
competency." Rust, 97 S.E. at 331 (quoting Instruction 3); Huff, 78 S.E. at 575 (quoting Instruction 0).
269Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 627 (quoting Instruction 9, second paragraph).

270 Id.

at 629 n.4 (quoting Rust, 97 S.E. at 331(citations omitted); VIRGINIA MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL R. 48.055 (Repl. ed.201 1) (bracket alterations in the original)).
271VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL R. 48.055.
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For the presumption of testamentary capacity, (1) the basic fact is due
execution; (2) the presumed fact is testamentary capacity; and (3) the burden to prove testamentary capacity, absent operation of the presumption,
rests upon the proponent. By analogy to the Model Jury Instruction on lost
wills, the jury should be instructed that when the basic fact of execution is
proven, the presumed fact of testamentary capacity exists, and to overcome
this presumption the burden is on the opponent to prove that testator did not
possess testamentary capacity.
The direct analogy made by footnote 4 among (1) the Model Jury Instruction on lost wills, (2) the Kiddell instructions, and (3) the H-R-T instruction demands these conclusions: (1) the Kiddell instructions shift the
burden of proving testamentary capacity to the opponent because the Model
Jury Instruction on lost wills shifts the burden of proof on proving revocation, and (2) the H-R-T instruction must have shifted the burden of proof
because the H-R-T and the Kiddell instructions are "functional equivalent[s] ."272
Accepting those analogies would make Kiddell the 12 ' unannounced reversal in the party bearing the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation, and would do so in a manner reminiscent of Temple, Wallen and
Tate, all of which expressly shifted the burden of proof when the presumption of testamentary capacity operated. 273
However, that interpretation of footnote 4 means that all persisting rebuttable presumptions shift the burden of proof. Whenever a jury is told to take
a presumption "into consideration," which is what persisting rebuttable presumptions require, that jury also could be given this functional equivalent
instruction: the presumed fact exists until the party against whom the presumption operates proves that the presumed fact did not exist. Having all
persisting rebuttable presumptions shift the burden of proof is not consistent
with Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:301, which states: "Unless otherwise provided by Virginia common law or statute, in a civil action a rebuttable presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not
shift to such party the burden of proof, which remains throughout the trial
upon the party on whom it originally rested." 274 Because footnote 4 likely
does not intend to change the law of evidence to that extent in a footnote,
the meaning of footnote 4 is not apparent.

272Kiddell, 733

S.E.2d at 635 (Kinser, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
supra section I.A.
274 VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:301 (Repl. Vol.
2014).
273See
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After Kiddell, the Virginia Model Jury Instructions were updated to account for that case. 275 Included in the discussion, but not in the text of any
instructions was the following:
[T]he Court [in Kiddell] held that the [trial] court did not err in granting two jury instructions as to the existence of the presumption, the requirement that the
opponents introduce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, and as to the
burdens and standards of proof. This Instruction [No. 48.040] and Instruction
No. 48.090 should be adapted to include the issues and findings as may be ap276
plicable to a particular case.

Notably, the Virginia Model Jury Instructions propose no such adaptations.
Silence is open to many interpretations, yet the failure of the Model Jury
Instructions to create instructions based on Kiddell is some indication that
the task is not straightforward. Consequently, additional litigation is required to resolve issues surrounding the Kiddell instructions. The issues
likely to be considered in future litigation, in addition to the meaning of
footnote 4, are addressed in the next section.
D. Conduct of Testamentary Capacity Litigation after Kiddell
The following are the instructions approved in Kiddell:
8.1.The proponent of the will ... is entitled to a presumption that [testator] had
2 77
testamentary capacity . .. at the time she executed the writing.
8.2.The opponents of the will . . . must introduce evidence sufficient to rebut
278
the presumption of testamentary capacity.
8.3.Jf you find that the opponents of the will have introduced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, the burden rests upon the proponent of the will
to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that [testator] had testamentary
279
capacity at the time of the execution of the . . . writing.
9.1.You shall find your verdict in favor of [opponents] if you find that they
have introduced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of testamentary
capacity and [proponent] has failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that [testator] had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of
280
the writing.
9.2.You shall find your verdict in favor of the [proponent] if the [opponents]

275VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL

R. 48.040 (2013).
Id.
277 Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622, 627 (Va. 2012). That instruction will be further
referred to as
Instruction 8.1.
278 Id. That instruction will be further referred to as Instruction
8.2.
279 Id. That instruction will be further referred to as Instruction
8.3.
280Id. That instruction will be further referred to as Instruction 9.1.
276
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have failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of testamentary capacity or [proponent] has proved testamentary capacity at the time
281
of execution by the greater weight of the evidence.

1. Summary of the Kiddell Instructions
a. Instruction 8 and its Three Parts
Instruction 8.1 states the existence of the presumption of testamentary
capacity, without any condition to its operation. 28 2 Instruction 8.2 flatly requires the opponent to introduce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity. 28 3 Instruction 8.3 states a consequence: if the
opponent satisfies the requirement of introducing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity, then the burden rests upon
the proponent to prove testamentary capacity by the greater weight of the
evidence. 28 4
The sequence of presentation in Instruction 8 places the burden of proof
upon the opponent. The jury is told, first, a presumption exists; second, opponents must do something-rebut the presumption by sufficient evidence;
and third, only if the opponents accomplish that thing-rebut the presumption by sufficient evidence-does a burden arise on the proponent. 28 5
b. Instruction 9 and its Two Parts
Instruction 9 is a so-called finding instruction: telling the jury to "find"
for one party or the other when certain conditions are met. 28 6
Instruction 9.1 tells the jury to find for the opponent IF (1) opponent introduced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption AND (2) proponent
failed to prove testamentary capacity by the greater weight of the evidence. 28 7
Instruction 9.2 tells the jury to find for the proponent IF (1) opponent
failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption OR pro-

281Id. That instruction will be further referred to as Instruction 9.2.
282Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 627. Note that the instruction does not condition operation of the presumption

on the basic fact of due execution. The jury was told that the presumption exists.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis
added).
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ponent proved testamentary capacity by the greater weight of the evi-

dence. 288
Note that 9.2 twice breaks syntactic consistency with the other four instructions: "introduce evidence" becomes "present evidence" and "rebut the
presumption" become "overcome the presumption. "289
2. "Sufficient Evidence" Compared to "Greater Weight of the
Evidence"
Instructions 8.2, 8.3, 9.1, and 9.2 state a condition of the opponent introducing or presenting "evidence sufficient" to rebut or overcome the presumption of testamentary capacity. 290 Instructions 8.3, 9.1, and 9.2 state a
condition of the proponent proving testamentary capacity by the "greater
weight of the evidence." 29 1 The jury instructions did not define "sufficient
evidence," but the Supreme Court of Virginia did.
When a word [sic] is commonly used and has an accepted meaning, a trial court
need not instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word. Black's Law Dictionary treats "sufficient evidence" and "satisfactory evidence" as synonymous. It
defines "satisfactory evidence" as "[e]vidence that is sufficient to satisfy an unprejudiced mind seeking the truth. - Also termed sufficient evidence; satisfactory proof" "Sufficient" means "[a]dequate; of such quality, number, force or
value as is necessary for a given purpose <sufficient consideration> <sufficient
evidence>. 292

"Sufficient evidence" is the amount of evidence "sufficient to satisfy an
unprejudiced mind seeking the truth."293 Yet, what amount of evidence is
sufficient to create truth? At a minimum, truth requires at least the "greater
weight of the evidence." 294 How can a thing be regarded as true if it has not
been proven at least by the greater weight of the evidence? Consequently,
under the definition in Kiddell, "sufficient evidence" is equivalent to, or
greater than, "the greater weight of the evidence." 295

Id.
Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 628 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Virginia did
not explain why it
used Black's Law Dictionary to define the commonly used and accepted meaning for words used in a
288
289

jury instruction. Dictionaries of more general circulation likely are better sources for meanings generally

accepted by the public from which jurors are drawn. See id.
293 Id.
294See id. at 627.
295

Id.
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Therefore, the Kiddell instructions and Kiddell's definition of "sufficient
evidence" require the opponent to prove true the rebutting or overcoming of
the presumption, which raises the question of the meanings of "rebut" and
overcome.
3. The Meaning of "Rebut" in the Kiddell Instructions
Instructions 8.2, 8.3, and 9.1 state a condition on the opponent to "introduce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity." 29 6 Instruction 9.2 states a condition on the opponent to "present evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of testamentary capacity." 297
In Kiddell, "rebut" was not defined in the jury instructions or by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The commonly understood meaning of rebut is "to
prove something is false by using arguments or evidence." 298 The commonly understood meaning of overcome is "to defeat." 299 Therefore Instructions
8.2, 8.3, and 9.1 require the jury to decide if the opponent introduced evidence sufficient to prove false the presumption of testamentary capacity.
Instruction 9.2 uses the verb "overcome," rather than "rebut," so Instruction
9.2 requires the jury to decide if the opponent defeated the presumption of
testamentary capacity. 300 Those common meanings of "rebut" and "overcome" clearly place the burden of proof upon the opponent to defeat capacity.
Under the law of evidence, the meaning of "rebut" markedly differs from
the commonly understood meaning. When a trial judge decides whether the
party against whom a bursting rebuttable presumption operates has "rebutted" the presumption, the judge decides whether that party has introduced
enough evidence "to create a jury question." 301 In that process, the trial
judge does not decide if that party has proven the presumed fact false. 302 Rather a question for the jury is created when "reasonable people could find in

296
297

Id.
Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 627.

298MERRIAM-WEBSTER, REBUT (2014), available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rebut.
299MERRIAM-WEBSTER, OVERCOME (2014), available at http://www.meniam-webster.com/dictionary/o

vercome.
.oo
Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 627.
3o1

FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 4-8, at 227 ("Where the presumption merely shifts the

burden of going forward, however, it would appear that the presumption is rebutted (i.e., disappears)
when the opponent has introduced enough evidence to justify the jury in finding the nonexistence of the
presumed fact-i.e., enough evidence to create a jury question as to whether Fact Two exists. Thereafter,
the case proceeds 'exactly as if no presumption had ever been applicable in the action."').
302FRIEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 5-6, at 316-17.

208

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

[Vol. XVIII:ii

favor of the party offering the evidence."3 03 Let us consider the sequence
that results if "rebut," in Instructions 8.2, 8.3, and 9.1, means what it means
in the general law of evidence.
Under that meaning of rebut, Instructions 8.2, 8.3, and 9.1 would require
the jury to decide if the opponent introduced evidence sufficient to create a
jury question about the presumption of testamentary capacity. Thus, the jury would be told the following: (1) decide if the opponent has introduced
enough evidence for reasonable people to find against testamentary capacity; (2) if not, find for the proponent; but (3) if so, forget the presumption
and make the proponent prove testamentary capacity.304 That process tells
the jury to presume that something-testamentary capacity-exists long
enough to decide whether to forget that it exists, and then to restart the factfinding process without the presumption. The difficulty of that process,
where the jury decides if a jury question exists, suggests that "rebut" in the
Kiddell Instructions should not interpreted to mean what it means in the
general law of evidence.
Consequently, under the commonly understood meaning of rebut, augmented by the substitution of "overcome" for "rebut" in Instruction 9.2, the
condition in the Kiddell instructions about the opponent introducing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity clearly
requires the opponents to prove testamentary capacity false. The demand
that opponents introduce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of
testamentary capacity exists as an independent requirement in Instruction
8.2, and as a conditional in sentences containing logical operators in Instructions 8.3, 9.1 and 9.2.
4. The Logical Conditions in Kiddell Instruction 9
Instructions 9.1 and 9.2 purport to state conditions under which the proponent must prove testamentary capacity by the greater weight of the evi-

...
FRiEND & SINCLAIR 2012, supra note 190, § 5-6 ("What is sufficient to create a jury question in Virginia? This is a matter controlled by case law and the substantive liability doctrines of the causes of action or criminal offenses being tried..... When the evidence is such that reasonable persons can differ on
the issue, a jury question has been created. A 'mere scintilla' of evidence is not enough, of course. There
must be sufficient evidence that reasonable people could find in favor of the party offering the evidence,
and this means, among other things, that the evidence offered is not contrary to natural laws or common
knowledge, or otherwise incredible.").
" That sequence can make sense when a judge acts as gatekeeper in deciding whether a question of fact
should be submitted to a jury, but makes no sense when applied by jury in actually finding facts.
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dence in order to win. Yet, that condition on the proponent does not arise
unless and until the opponent proves testamentary capacity false.3 05
Instruction 9.1 tells the jury to find for the opponent IF (1) opponent introduced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption AND (2) proponent
failed to prove testamentary capacity by the greater weight of the evidence.3 06 Under Instruction 9.1, if the opponent does not meet the IF condition-prove testamentary capacity false-then the jury does not proceed
across the AND statement.3 07 Thus, the burden of proof is on the opponent
under the only instruction that can result in the opponent winning the verdict.
Instruction 9.2 tells the jury to find for the proponent IF (1) opponent
failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption OR proponent proved testamentary capacity by the greater weight of the evidence.3 08 Under Instruction 9.2, if the IF condition is satisfied-the opponent
failed to prove testamentary capacity false-then the jury proceeds across the
OR statement and ostensibly, but not actually, the jury decides if the proponent proved testamentary capacity by the greater weight of the evidence.
Prior to crossing to the OR in Instruction 9.2, the jury will have already
decided that the opponent failed to prove testamentary capacity false. That
would mean that the jury decided that the truth-which is the requirement of
the "sufficient evidence" test-is that the lack of testamentary capacity is
false; therefore, testamentary capacity must be true. Consequently, the proponent never bears the burden of proof; rather, the proponent wins in the
absence of the opponent proving testamentary capacity false. In other
words, if the jury decides that the presumption of testamentary capacity was
not rebutted by evidence sufficient to satisfy an unprejudiced mind seeking
the truth, has not that jury necessarily decided that testamentary capacity
was proven by evidence sufficient to satisfy an unprejudiced mind seeking
the truth?
5. Instruction 9 Interpretations Creating Equipoise
A second possible interpretation of Instruction 9.1 creates an instance of
the equipoise problem. Instruction 9.1 tells the jury to find for the opponent

1os Kiddell,

733 S.E.2d at 627 ("[I]f you find that they have introduced evidence sufficient to rebut the
presumption of testamentary capacity and defendant, Mr. Labowitz, has failed to prove by the greater
weight of the evidence that Ms. Judsen had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the

writing.").
306Id. (emphasis added).

" Id. (emphasis added).
30

Id. (emphasis added).
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IF (1) opponent introduced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption

AND (2) proponent failed to prove testamentary capacity by the greater
weight of the evidence.3 09 Suppose the jury first applies the condition stated
second. That is, the jury first decides whether the proponent failed to prove
testamentary capacity by the greater weight of the evidence. That would
place the initial burden on the proponent, yet because the logical connection
is an AND, the opponent does not win unless the opponent also proves testamentary capacity false. Thus, the burden of proof would be on both parties. However, that interpretation creates an instance of equipoise rather
than solving it, and the reason for instructing the jury about the presumption, according to Kiddell, is to solve the equipoise problem. Consequently,
an interpretation of Instruction 9.1 that does not solve the equipoise problem should not be favored.
A third possible interpretation of Instruction 9.2 is that the OR connection between the logical statements means that both statements independently are evaluated and then compared. If so, 9.2 fights with itself
about who has the burden of proof. Under that interpretation the jury reads
Instruction 9.2 to say, "the opponent must prove incapacity; proponent must
prove capacity; you decide which happened." However, that interpretation
creates an instance of equipoise, and an interpretation of Instruction 9.2 that
does not solve the equipoise problem should not be favored.
6. Summary of Kiddell Instruction Interpretation
The Kiddell instructions either (1) shift the burden of proof to the opponent, under the logical conclusion of Kiddell's footnote 4, under which all
persistent presumptions shift the burden of proof; (2) shift the burden of
proof to the opponent, under Kiddell's definition of "sufficient evidence,"
which requires evidence sufficient to create truth, and the evaluation of the
logical statements in Instruction 9; or (3) establish no burden of proof, under an alternate evaluation of the logical statements in Instruction 9, which
interpretation should be disfavored because it creates an equipoise problem
rather than solving it.
Only subsequent cases can resolve which of those interpretations, or
some other, are given to the Kiddell instructions. Yet, the most probable
among those interpretations will result in a shift of the burden of proof to
the opponent, which would constitute the 12 unannounced reversal in the
party bearing the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation.

309Id. (emphasis added).
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7. The Pointless Condition of Due Execution
Although Kiddell states that the presumption of testamentary capacity
does not arise until the proponent proves 'compliance with all statutory requirements for the valid execution of the will,"'310 (1) the Kiddell instructions did not condition the presumption of testamentary capacity upon proof
of due execution; (2) no other Supreme Court of Virginia case speaks to the
manner by which the due execution condition of the testamentary capacity
presumption should be stated in the jury instructions; and (3) the Virginia
Model Jury Instructions do not include instructions about the presumption
of testamentary capacity, conditions to its operation, or the consequence of
its operation.
Indeed, not only do the opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia fail to
address particular language in jury instructions about the due execution
condition of the testamentary capacity presumption, the opinions are unclear about who would make the decision regarding whether due execution
condition was met. One would think that deciding whether the condition
had been met would be a question of fact for the jury. However, in Redford,
which was a will contest tried before a jury, the Supreme Court of Virginia
stated, "[t]he able chancellor was of opinion that the actual execution was
satisfactorily shown. We accept his judgment." 3 11
However, if we conclude that the decision of whether due execution occurred is a question of fact for the jury and should become part of the jury
instructions as a condition to operation of the presumption of testamentary
capacity as the Practice Commmentary (but not the text) of the Virginia
Model Jury Instructions suggest, 312 and the opinions seemingly require,
conditioning the presumption of testamentary capacity upon proof of due
execution is a meaningless and repetitive addition to the jury instructions.
The jury already will be told that proof of due execution is an independently
required element in a will contest.
Whenever a jury considers testamentary capacity, the jury necessarily
will have concluded that due execution occurred, and that jury will apply
the presumption of testamentary capacity. 313 Telling a jury twice that due

"'o Kiddell, 733 S.E.2d at 627-28 (quoting Gibbs v. Gibbs, 387 S.E.2d 499, 501 (Va. 1990)). "[T]he
proponent of the will is entitled to a presumption that testamentary capacity existed by proving compliance with all statutory requirements for the valid execution of the will." Id.
." Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 884 (Va. 1936).
312VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL R. 48.040 (2013).

One could posit a situation in which a jury decides to consider the element of testamentary capacity
before considering the element of due execution. However, if the jury decides that capacity was met,
313
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execution is required, first as an independent element of a will and another

time as a condition of the presumption of testamentary capacity is unnecessary. Instead, the jury should be told that due execution is required as well
as testamentary capacity and there is a presumption of testamentary capacity. In other words, the Kiddell instructions do not need to be amended to
add a condition of due execution, even when due execution is contested, because the element of due execution is an independent element in the test for
whether a writing is a will.
In addition, if the due execution condition actually is intended to create a
distinct, separate condition prior to the application of the presumption of
testamentary capacity, the cases have not considered two "recent" changes
to the rules regarding the execution of wills in Virginia: (1) self-proving affidavits, and (2) the harmless error rule. Self-proving affidavits were added
to the Code of Virginia in 1972;314 the harmless error rule was added in

2007.315
Under the "self-proving affidavit" procedure, "[a] will, at the time of its
execution or at any subsequent date, may be made self-proved by the acknowledgment thereof by the testator and the affidavits of the attesting witnesses, each made before an officer authorized to administer oaths ....
In addition, "[t]he officer's certificate shall be substantially ... in form and
content" prescribed by the statute, which form and certificate recite all of
the requirements for proper execution of a will in Virginia. 317
Regarding the consequences of such affidavits, the Virginia statute provides, "the affidavits of any such witnesses taken as provided by this section, whenever made, shall be accepted by the court as if it had been taken
ore tenus before such court." 3 18 However, while the statute equates the affidavits with testimony before a trial court, it does not address their consequence on the presumption arising from due execution.
In Virginia, we do not know which of the following state the consequence of a self-proving affidavit. Is the self-proving affidavit only testi-

perhaps even by operation of the presumption of testamentary capacity, the jury then will decide whether due execution occurred, and if it did not, the jury will find against the writing as a will. In any event,
it is not necessary to tell the jury to decide due execution twice.
314 1972 Va. Acts 117 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-452, -453 (Repl.
Vol. 2012)).
315 2007 Va. Acts 735 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (Repl.
Vol. 2012)).
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2452 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
1 Compare § 64.2-452 and § 64.2-453, the self-proving affidavit statutes, with VA. CODE ANN.
403 (2012 & Supp. 2014), the statute listing the requirements for a will.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-452 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
316

§ 64.2-
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mony? 9 Does it create a presumption of due execution? Does it establish
due execution unless the opponent proves one of a limited set of challenges?
Although the Virginia statutes are silent on the point, the Uniform Probate Code, from which the self-proving affidavit statute was derived, chose
the third option. When a self-proving affidavit is tendered into evidence,
questions of due execution may not be contested "unless there is evidence
of fraud or forgery affecting the acknowledgment or affidavit."3 20 Would
Virginia apply that rule? And, would not such a presumption of due execution automatically carry with it the additional presumption of testamentary
capacity arising from proof of due execution?
The self-proving affidavit procedure creates optional, heightened formalities, with the consequent benefit of immunizing against some challenges to
due execution. Although the extent of such immunity in Virginia is not
known, making due execution harder to contest should nearly guarantee that
the presumption of testamentary capacity arising upon due execution will
occur, and thus under Kiddell the jury virtually is guaranteed to hear the instruction about the due execution presumption whenever the probate of a
self-proved will is contested. Therefore, if due execution and testamentary
capacity are contested in a self-proved will case and Kiddell's language,
stating that due execution is a condition of the presumption of testamentary
capacity, controls, litigants and judges will face the question of whether the
presumption of testamentary capacity arising from due execution can be
based upon the presumption of due execution arising from a self-proving
affidavit.
The second recent development, not incorporated into the Kiddell rule,
emerges from the other end of the formalities spectrum: the harmless error
rule for formally defective executions. Adopted in 2007, Section 64.2-404
provides that a document or writing not executed in compliance with the
wills statute shall be treated as if it had been executed in compliance with
that statute "ifthe proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear

" If the affidavit is mere testimony, then the self-proving affidavit is pointless. Even when an attesting
witness is dead, the act of attestation certifies the witness's belief about capacity.
The Court instructs the jury that although . . . one of the attesting witnesses to the Chumbley will is
dead, yet you are instructed that the placing of his name to the will is, in effect, certificate to his belief of
the mental capacity of [testator] at the time, and that the will was executed by her freely and understandingly, with full knowledge of its contents; and you are further instructed that the attestation by the said
[witness] is, in effect, a representation that such witness believed the testatrix understood what she was
doing and was competent to do so at the time.
Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151, 161 (1950).
320UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-406(1) (amended 2010).
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and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing
to constitute (i) the decedent's will . . . "321
After the Kiddell decision, members of the bench and bar must decide
whether, when due execution is contested, the Kiddell instructions about
testamentary capacity need to be amended to include a condition of due execution on the operation of the presumption of testamentary capacity. However, as discussed above, that condition does not need to be added because
the element of due execution is an independent element in the test for
whether a writing is a will. If due execution is contested, an instruction requiring due execution already will be included, and there is no need to require due execution twice. Even if trial courts are inclined to add that condition, due execution rarely will be contested because self-proving affidavits
and the harmless error rule greatly will reduce the number of cases in which
due execution will be contested.
IV. OTHER COMMENTS ON TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY LITIGATION

In the Tabb decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the Culpepper rule cited by opponents because "[t]hat case, to a large extent, turns upon its facts and so is not controlling here." 3 22 Notwithstanding that disclaimer about the value of precedent in fact sensitive cases, some themes emerge.
A. Oscillations in the Rule Regarding the Weight of Attesting Witness
Testimony
Trial testimony in virtually all testamentary capacity cases includes the
testimony of two individuals who witnessed the testator's signing or acknowledgment of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.3 23
Indeed, an animating purpose of the statute of wills is to ensure that such
witnesses routinely will be available.3 24 In the testamentary capacity opinions, such witnesses interchangeably are called "subscribing" or "attesting"

VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (Repl. Vol. 2012). That section was adopted in 2007 as § 64.1-87.1. 2007
Va. Acts 735. The section was re-codified in 2012. 2012 Va. Act 1167, 1185.
322 Tabb v. Willis, 156 S.E. 556, 565 (Va. 1931). Earlier in the Tabb opinion the Supreme Court
of Virginia wrote: "This case, like most will cases, turns upon the evidence, which here is voluminous. Its examination must be tedious but, of necessity, is unavoidable." Id. at 557.
323 In Virginia, a will "wholly in the testator's handwriting and signed by the testator" need not be witnessed, yet nearly all of the reported testamentary capacity cases involve formal, witnessed wills, rather
than holographic ones. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-403 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2014).
324
Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 8
(1941).
321
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witnesses, with the former term used in older cases3 25 and the latter in more

recent.3 26
1. Attesting Witness Cases Where Deference is Given
The purpose of attesting witnesses and their near universal presence in
testamentary capacity cases gave rise to rules regarding the weight of their
testimony. As early as 1825, the Supreme Court of Virginia indicated that
the evidence of attesting witnesses is entitled to added weight.
What is the employment of the witness? It is to inspect and judge of the testator's sanity, before they attest; and if he is not capable, they ought not to attest.
In other cases, the witnesses are passive; here they are active, and the principal
327
parties to the transaction. The testator is entrusted to their care.

In Weedon (2012), the Supreme Court of Virginia's most recent decision
on the matter, the court said "[i]n determining the mental capacity of a testator, great weight is to be attached to the testimony of the draftsman of the
will, of the attesting witnesses, and of attending physicians." 328
But the decisions between Burton in 1825 and Weedon in 2012 that have
addressed the weight of attesting witness testimony do not fit neatly in an
unbroken line of authority. Like the burden-of-proof cases, the attestingwitness-weight cases oscillate between greater and lesser deference. Presently, the case law seems to be at a point of high deference, with attesting
witness testimony nearly unassailable.
In Weedon, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed a trial court's finding
of fact that the proponent of a will had not carried her evidentiary burden to
show that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time she executed her
will. 329 The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's decision was
"based on an incorrect view of the law and an improper weighing of the evidence." 330 The trial court's "incorrect view of the law" occurred when the
trial court gave "diminished weight to [a legal assistant's] testimony because she was not the literal 'drafter' of the will."331 The trial court's "improper weighing of the evidence" consisted of two errors: (1) the trial

325
326

Burton v. Scott, 24 Va. (1 Rand) 399, 401 (1825) ("subscribing witnesses").
Kiddell v. Labowitz, 733 S.E.2d 622, 632 (Va. 2012) ("attesting witnesses").

327 Burton, 24 Va. (1 Rand) at 401 (citing 4 RICHARD BURN, THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 88 (Robert

Phillimore ed., 9th ed. 1842)).
328 Weedon v. Weedon, 720 S.E.2d 552, 558 (Va. 2012).
329
Id. at 561.
..
oId. at 559.
'' Id. at 558-59.
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court's "placing undue weight" on the fact that someone other than the testator initiated the telephone call to the drafting lawyer's office when the testator spoke with the lawyer's assistant and during that call, in the judgment
of the appellate court, the testator "clearly expressed her desires as to how
she wanted her will changed,"33 2 and (2) the trial court's "placing more
weight" upon the testimony of witnesses not present at the will's execution
than on those present at the execution. 3 33
Similarly, in 1998 the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed a trial court's
finding of fact for over-crediting general testimony about the testator at the
expense of attesting witness testimony.
The [opponent's] evidence related to the testator's mental capacity did not directly contradict the testimony of those present at the time the testator executed
the 1988 will or at any time on the day it was executed. While the [opponent's]
evidence established that at other times the testator might very well have lacked
the requisite mental capacity to execute a will, the respondents offered only lay
witness testimony. As such, the observations of these witnesses are valuable
only to provide "facts which indicate such incapacity" generally, and not as evidence of incapacity on the date the will was executed. Thornton v. Thornton 's
Ex'rs, 141 Va. 232, 237, 126 S.E. 69, 70 (1925). In such cases, the testimony of
lay witnesses will not overthrow the testimony of the witnesses to the execution
of the will where the latter evidence is clear as to the testator's capacity at the
time the will was executed. See id. at 239, 126 S.E. at 71.334

By citing to Thornton, Fields referred to one of a group of cases in the
1910s and 1920s that similarly made attesting witness testimony virtually
unassailable.
Consider Huff from 1913.
Expressions of opinions by witnesses that the testator was not competent to
make a will based upon facts which do not sustain the opinions are not to be
considered as conflicting with the evidence of the witnesses of the factum who
speak of the testator's condition immediately at the time of the execution of the
paper in question and unite in the unqualified statement to the effect that when
the paper was executed by the testator his mind was clear and good, and that he
335
knew all about what he was doing."

While the Huff decision could be read to require that the attesting witnesses' testimony be "united" as to capacity in order to become unassailable, the Young v. Barnerdecision tells us that the testimony of any attesting

332Id. at 559.

.. Weedon, 720 S.E.2d at 559.
334 Fields

v. Fields, 499 S.E.2d 826, 828-29 (Va. 1998).
11 Huff v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573, 579 (Va. 1913) (citing Wooddy v. Taylor, 77 S.E. 498 (Va. 1913)).
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witnesses against capacity "is to be received with the most scrupulous jealousy."336
Other cases that similarly concluded that attesting witness testimony is
entitled to "peculiar weight" and approved a jury instruction to that effect
include Trice337 (1929), Thornton338 (1925), and Rust 339 (1918). Others cases
that draw the same conclusion but use different terminology include
Young 340 (1876), Riddell 341 (1875), and Parramorev. Taylor3 42 (1854).
However, there have been cases in which less, or no deference was paid
to attesting witness testimony.
2. Attesting Witness Cases Where Deference is Not Given
In Lewis v. Roberts (1967), the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed a
judgment entered on a jury verdict against a will. 343 The court noted that
while "there was testimony of attesting witnesses that at the time of the execution of the wills in question [testator] appeared to be sober and normal in
all respects," 3 44 and there "were numerous witnesses, both lay and profes-

Young v. Barner, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 96, 103 (1876) (citing 1 JARMAN ON WILLS 77 (6th ed.)).
" Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251, 256 (Va. 1929) ("[I]t is well settled that the testimony of the subscribing witness at the time of the act is entitled to peculiar weight.").
338 Thornton v. Thornton's Ex'rs, 126 S.E. 69, 71 (Va. 1925) In Thornton, one of the subscribing witnesses "was called in from the street, had never seen the testator before, paid little attention to the transaction, and his testimony, while it fails to support the testator's capacity, is negative". Id. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed a verdict in favor of the opponents, based on the testimony of
the other subscribing witness. "This testimony [of the subscribing witness in favor of capacity], unless
overthrown, fully meets every requirement of the law for it is well settled that the testimony of the subscribing witness at the time of the act is entitled to peculiar weight." Id. (emphasis added).
.' Rust v. Reid, 97 S.E. 324, 331 (Va. 1918) "The court instructs the jury that the testimony of credible
336

witnesses present at the execution of the will is entitled to peculiar weight on the question of testamen-

tary capacity and that this is especially true of attesting witnesses whose duty it is to ascertain and judge
of the testator's mental capacity at the time." Id. (quoting Instruction 4).
340Barner, 68 Va. (1 Gratt.) at 103 ("[I]t is also held upon good authority, that a person who signs his
name as a witness to a will, by his act of attestation solemnly testifies to the sanity of the testator." (citing 1 JARIAN ON WILLS 77 (6th ed.)).
341Riddell v. Johnson's Exr, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 152, 178 (1875) ("The three subscribing witnesses, who

are regarded in law as placed around the testator that no fraud may be practiced on him in the execution
of the will, and to ascertain and judge of his capacity, all of whom are represented to be men of intelligence and respectability, were not only of that opinion, (and the law makes their opinion evidence,) but
facts are proved by them and others, which, in connection with the intrinsic evidence furnished by the
instrument itself, excludes all doubt that the testator was of sound disposing mind.").
342 Parramore v. Taylor, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 220, 222 (1854) ("He is by far the most important witness
in
this cause; and if his testimony is to be believed, it conclusively settles at least two of the three questions
arising in the case. He was the scrivener who wrote both the will and the codicil, as well as a prior will;
was present at the execution and acknowledgment of all of them, and was a subscribing witness to all.").
343Lewis v. Roberts, 152 S.E.2d 44, 50 (Va. 1967).
34 Id. at 45.
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sional, who testified on behalf of the [opponents] as to [testator's] insanity,"
including "[f]ive general practitioners who had treated her," . . . [t]wo psychiatrists and a psychologist," . . . and "members of [testator's] family,
friends and other persons [who] testified as to her unfounded hatred towards
her children as well as to delusions and other irrational behavior." 3 45
In Redford v Booker, affirming a judgment entered on a jury verdict
against a will, the Supreme Court of Virginia, after noting that in "contests
of this kind we turn first to the testimony of attesting witnesses," 346 summarily dismissed that testimony.347
In contests of this kind we turn first to the testimony of attesting witnesses.
Usually they know what they are doing. The presumption is that they would not
aid in the execution of a will had they cause to doubt its validity. If there be any
question, Jenkins v. Trice, 152 Va. 411, 147 S.E. 251, 256, gives us an excellent example of what should then be done. There "the attesting witnesses, after
conference, deliberately reached the conclusion that the testator was competent
to make a will." On the other hand: " * * if they had no previous acquaintance
with the testator, were not selected by him, and nothing was said or done by
him at the time to indicate his then mental condition, it is said that their testi3 48
mony is not accorded the weight which would otherwise attach to it."

The attesting witnesses were bank employees, asked to witness the will
during the course of their normal business duties. 349 "The evidence of [the
attesting witnesses] has been stated. They were strangers to [testator], took
no interest in the transaction and witnessed this will merely because they
were asked to do it. They did not even take the trouble to read the attestation clause. They do not help us." 350
Thus the Redford decision makes much of the attesting witnesses not
knowing either the testator or the contents of the will. However, before we
conclude that deference is granted to attesting witnesses only when they
know the testator, the contents of the will, or both, we must consider the
Tabb and Dearing v. Dearing decisions. In Tabb, when reversing a judg-

345Id. at 49.

Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 886, 88 (Va. 1936) "It is pertinent to remember that Mr. Dyson did
not think that Mrs. Redford could make a will, but wrote to humor her." Id. at 888. So Redford tells us
that "the presumption is that they [attesting witnesses] would not aid in the execution of a will had they
cause to doubt its validity," but drafters do write wills to humor the putative testators!
346

3

Id. at 890-91.

Id. at 886 (quoting Forehand v. Sawyer, 136 S.E. 683, 688 (Va. 1927); Thorntonv. Thornton's Ex'rs,
126 S.E. 69 (Va. 1925)).

348

349Id. at 883.

15oId. at 883, 866.
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ment entered on a jury verdict against a will, the Supreme Court of Virginia
said "few subscribing witnesses do."351
As against this we have the testimony of subscribing witnesses. They are the
subjects of a vigorous attack, and are charged with knowingly participating in a
fraud. It should be conceded that they might have examined with more care into
the condition of the testatrix, but they were inexperienced in such matters and
saw no reason to do so. They had been sent for to witness the will. They went
and found the testatrix ill and propped up in bed. They announced the purpose
for which they had come. The will was produced; the testatrix in signing it
asked [one of the attesting witnesses] to steady her arm, and this she did. When
it was over [testatrix] said that she was "glad it was all fixed." They did not
read the will and few subscribing witnesses do. They merely appeared at the
request of the testatrix, and withdrew when they had done all that they had been
3 52
asked to do.

In Dearing, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's
overturning of a jury verdict against a will. 353 To support its conclusion that
"[a] careful examination of the evidence reveals nothing which would warrant a jury in finding that the paper writing .. . is not the true last will and
testament of [testator]," 354 the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the testimony of the attesting witnesses.
Neither is it required that the witnesses to a will should read it or examine it
with such care as to be able, upon application to admit to probate, to say that all
the pages or clauses of the proposed will were the pages and clauses signed by
the testator and attested by them." . . . "[T]he forgetfulness of the accessible
subscribing witness, as to certain necessary facts of execution, does not avoid a
prima facie case made out by proof of the genuineness of the signature of the
testator and the subscribing witnesses. So, where the subscribing witnesses
identify their signatures, but have no recollection of having attested the instrument, or the circumstances of execution, the presumption that it was properly
executed will uphold it in the absence of clear and satisfactory proof to the contrary."3 55

35'

Tabb v. Willis, 156 S.E. 556, 564 (Va. 1931).

352Id. at 564. In Tabb, the proponents demurred to the evidence and the jury found against the will, sub-

ject to the decision of the court on the demurrer to the evidence. The court sustained the demurrer to the
evidence and entered judgment in favor of the proponents, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.
156 S.E. 556.
1 Dearing v. Dearing, 111 S.E. 286, 291 (Va. 1922).
354Id. (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 288-89 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BOWE & DOUGLAS PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 372 (2004)).
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3. Summary of the Attesting Witness Cases
The testimony of the attesting witnesses about the execution ceremony
governs and establishes testamentary capacity unless their testimony is unclear on the point or expert testimony from physicians who examined the
testator call capacity into question. Without examining experts, testimony
about the execution ceremony apparently governs.
In addition, if one of the attesting witnesses testifies in favor of capacity
and the other against, the testimony against capacity "is to be received with
suspicion," 356 to the point that "no fact stated by such a witness can be relied
on when he is not corroborated by other witnesses." 357
B. Strategies
The possibility of a capacity challenge exists in every attempt to prove a
will. The cases identify a particular situation in which the probability of a
capacity challenge increases. Whenever a new will makes a significant
change from an earlier will, the capacity challenge is invited by the change
itself "The right to change a will is not questioned, but where this change
overturns a purpose long manifest it is of evidential value as in some
measures gauging the mentalities of the testatrix and the influences which
brought it about." 358
A careful reading of the cases identifies some strategies to use when capacity challenges are anticipated.
1. Lifetime Gifts to Anticipated Challengers
In Wooddy, the testator made a lifetime gift, about the same time as he
executed his will, to an individual who later challenged the testator's will.359
The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the acceptance of the check was
inconsistent with a belief that the testator lacked capacity at that time, and
accordingly discredited that witness's testimony against capacity. 360 The testator "gave [an individual] a check for $50, and yet this [individual] ex-

Cheatham v. Hatcher, 71 Va. (1 Gratt.) 56, 64 (1878) (citing Kinleside v. Harrison, (1818) 161 Eng.
Rep. 1196; 2 Phill. Ecc. 449).
3 Id.
35' Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 888 (Va. 1936) (quoting Hartman v. Strickler, 82 Va. 225, 238
(1886)).
35 Wooddy v. Taylor, 77 S.E. 498, 499 (Va. 1913).
360Id. at 500-01.
356
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pressed the opinion that at the time of the visit mentioned [where the check
was accepted] the testator was not competent to make a will."361 The Supreme Court of Virginia described the testimony of that gift recipient as
"valueless and without weight as a basis for the opinion that testator was
incompetent to make the will involved in this controversy." 362
2. Attesting Witness Strategies
As noted above, the decisions generally state that the testimony of the attesting witnesses governs and establishes testamentary capacity unless their
testimony is unclear on the point or expert testimony from physicians who
examined the testator calls capacity into question. Some cases buttress the
deference given to attesting witness by noting special characteristics of the
witnesses in those cases.
a. Independent Lawyer as Attesting Witness
When a capacity challenge is anticipated, the drafting lawyer should consider using an independent lawyer expressly hired to judge capacity. In
Montague v. Allan's Executor,363 the Supreme Court of Virginia endorsed
that strategy. "Mr. Ellyson, an educated lawyer, who was called in to attest
the execution of the will, with the view of testing her testamentary capacity,
conversed with her on the occasion when she executed the will, and was
perfectly satisfied as to the condition of her mind; that he 'was perfectly
certain of her capacity to make a will, and was so struck with her mental
vigor, for one of her age, that he remarked on it when he got home.'"364
b. County Clerk as Drafter
Although the strategy of having a county clerk of court draft and supervise the execution of a will may not generally be available, it was extraordinarily helpful in Trice.365 In that case, six physicians, all of whom examined
and treated testator, and one of whom had known testator from boyhood,

361Id. at 500.
362Id. at 501.

Montaguev. Allan's Ex'r, 78 Va. 592, 596 (1884).
Id. at 596.
365 Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251, 255 (Va.
1929).
363

'
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testified that he lacked capacity.3 66 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the will, and noted
that there was high quality evidence regarding the execution of the will, including the drafter of the will who was "county clerk of Goochland County
and has been in that office from forty-five to fifty years. His father, grandfather and great-grandfather have held it uninterruptedly since 1790. He was
no ordinary lay witness." 3 67
c. Conference
When a capacity challenge is anticipated, the drafting lawyer should consider having the attesting witnesses confer about capacity and memorialize
their conclusion that capacity existed. "If there be any question [about capacity], Jenkins v. Trice gives us an excellent example of what should then
be done. There 'the attesting witnesses, after conference, deliberately
reached the conclusion that the testator was competent to make a will. "368
3. Attending Physician Testimony
While this article has demonstrated that many rules regarding testamentary capacity claimed by the Supreme Court of Virginia to have been applied uniformly for centuries actually have been subject to significant variation, the deference to attending physician testimony is not among them.
From Burton to Weedon, great weight is attached to the testimony of attending physicians.
In Burton (1825), the Supreme Court of Virginia said, "Physicians are
considered as occupying a high grade on such questions [of capacity], both
because they are generally men of cultivated minds and observation, and
because, from the course of their education and pursuits, they are supposed
to have turned their attention more particularly to such subjects, and therefore, to be able to discriminate more accurately; especially a physician who
has attended the patient through the disease, which is supposed to have disabled his mind." 369 Indeed, in Burton, testimony of physicians ranked higher
than the testimony of lawyers about application of the legal standard of testamentary capacity.

366

Id. at 254-55.

367Id. at 255.
368
369

Redford v. Booker, 185 S.E. 879, 886 (Va. 1936) (citing Trice, 147 S.E. at 256).
Burton v. Scott, 24 Va. (1 Rand.) 399, 403-04 (1825).
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On the other hand, there are some most respectable witnesses, who did not
think him capable of making a will. In the first rank of these, are Smith and Anthony, two attorneys, one called in, in 1817, the other, in 1821, to draw wills
for Major Scott. They both state that they thought him incapable, and give their
reasons. But these gentlemen, however respectable, (and none can be more so)
are, I think, overweighed by the two physicians, whose opportunities were better, and who, for the reasons before given, would be considered abler judges in
370
such a case.

Other cases drawing the same conclusion about the testimony of examining physician testimony include the following. In Parramore,the Supreme
Court of Virginia wrote, "Ihave stated thus fully the evidence of the attending physicians, because it is entitled to great and peculiar weight in determining the question now under consideration." 3 71 In Montague, the Supreme
Court of Virginia wrote, "[p]hysicians are considered as occupying a high
grade on such questions, ... especially a physician who has attended the patient through the disease which is supposed to have disabled her mind." 372
By contrast, physician testimony by experts who did not examine testator
but were hired for litigation largely is ignored.
This witness had practically no acquaintance with the testator, had not seen him
for many years, and says that, having no personal knowledge of the facts, he
would have no right to question at all the opinion of a doctor who knew him intimately and had attended him as his family physician for more than 40
37 3
years.

4. Dispositions as Substantive Evidence of Capacity
In addition to testimony about the testator, the dispositions themselves
can be used to demonstrate testamentary capacity.
In all questions of testamentary capacity, particularly where the evidence is
conflicting, the courts are inclined much to consider the dispositions contained
in the will. If such dispositions be in themselves consistent with the situation of
the testator, in conformity with his affections and previous declarations-if they
be such as might justly have been expected-this is itself said to be persuasive
evidence of testamentary capacity. The rationality of the act goes to shew the
reason of the person. This rule has been repeatedly applied in the English courts
374
in cases of doubtful capacity from age or sickness.

370
1'

Id. at 405.
Parramore v. Taylor, 52 Va. (1 Gratt.) 220, 228 (1854) (citing Burton, 24 Va. (1 Rand.) at 403).

Montague v. Allan's Ex'r, 78 Va. 592, 597 (1884). (citing Cheatham v. Hatcher, 71 Va. (1 Gratt.) 56
(1878)).
1
Wooddy v. Taylor, 77 S.E. 498, 501 (Va. 1913).
374 Young v. Barner, 68 Va. (1 Gratt.) 96, 103 (1876) (citing 1 JARMAN ON WILLs 82 (6th ed.)).
372
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V. CONCLUSION

This article is a piece of doctrinal scholarship, describing which party
bears the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation and describing
whether and how a presumption of testamentary capacity operates, as well
as a piece of historical analysis, demonstrating two disturbing practices of
the Supreme Court of Virginia within those doctrines: a rather cavalier attitude in not following precedent, and a rather careless method of citing it.
Those practices have created a glaring inefficiency in Virginia common
law. On three basic points of law, (1) who bears the burden of proof in testamentary capacity cases; (2) whether and how a presumption of capacity
exists; and (3) whether and how the jury is instructed about that presumption, the Supreme Court of Virginia blithely asserts that it has applied law
uniformly for a hundred or more years; it has not.
Prior to Kiddell, 29 cases decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia discussed the burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation; eight placed
the burden of proof upon the opponent, and 21 placed the burden on the
proponent. Of the eight opponent-burden cases, five stated that rule as a
matter of law (Group One cases), 3 75 and three stated it as a consequence of
the presumption of testamentary capacity (Group Two cases). 37 6 Of the 21
cases that placed the burden of proof upon the proponent, eight did not
mention any presumption (Group Three cases); 377 seven indicated that a presumption of testamentary capacity existed, but it is a mere evidentiary presumption not told to the jury (Group Four cases); 378 and six indicated that
the presumption is told to the jury as something to "take into consideration"

(Group Five cases). 379

Tabb v. Willis, 156 S.E. 556, 564 (Va. 1931); Smith v. Ottley, 132 S.E. 512, 514 (Va. 1926); Wooddy, 77 S.E. at 500; Burton v. Scott, 24 Va. (1 Rand.) 399, 400-03 (1825); Spencer v. Moore, 8 Va. (1
Call) 423, 425 (1798).
376 Tate v. Chumbley, 57 S.E.2d 151, 160 (Va. 1950); Wallen v. Wallen, 57 S.E. 596, 597-99 (Va.
1907); Temple v. Temple, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476,477 (1807).
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The Court's decision in Kiddell continued the theme of inadequately researched decisions. According to Kiddell, only Group Five cases exist. Kiddell, like all 29 of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia,
except one in 1908, failed to discern any conflicts in its cases addressing the
burden of proof in testamentary capacity litigation.
Kiddell also is an inadequately-reasoned decision. It claims to be a Group
Five case, but that can be true only if "sufficient evidence," as used in the
jury instruction in Kiddell, means an amount of evidence less than the
"greater weight of the evidence." Kiddell defines "sufficient evidence" as
"[e]vidence that is sufficient to satisfy an unprejudiced mind seeking the
truth," which appears at least equal to the "greater weight of the evidence."
The jury instructions in Kiddell therefore either (1) shift the burden of
proof to the opponent, under the logical conclusion of Kiddell's footnote 4,
under which all persistent presumptions shift the burden of proof; (2) shift
the burden of proof to the opponent, under Kiddell's definition of "sufficient evidence," which requires evidence sufficient to create truth, and the
evaluation of the logical statements in Instruction 9; or (3) establish no burden of proof, under an alternate evaluation of the logical statements in Instruction 9, which interpretation should be disfavored because it creates an
equipoise problem rather than solving it.
Consequently, the most probable interpretation of the Kiddell instructions is that while they state that the burden of proof is upon the proponent,
they shift the burden of proof to the opponent when the presumption of testamentary capacity operates. Virginia law on testamentary capacity would
benefit from express recognition that the presumption of testamentary is not
conditioned upon proof of due execution of a writing as a will. That condition does not need to be included because the element of due execution already is an independent element in the test for whether a writing is a will.
Therefore, when due execution is contested, an instruction requiring due
execution already will be included, and there is no need to require due execution twice.
Perhaps in a larger irony, the net effect of Kiddell likely is a return to
Temple (1807), Wallen (1907), and Tate (1950), three points in the long
serpentine path traced by testamentary capacity cases during the history of
the Commonwealth. Temple, Wallen, and Tate concluded that the presumption of testamentary capacity shifts the burden of proving incapacity to the
opponent, as Kiddell apparently has done. And if so, that result can be

v. Welch, 78 S.E. 573, 575 (Va. 1913), Hopkins v. Wampler, 62 S.E. 926, 927-28 (Va. 1908).
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achieved much more directly than the circuitous route of the Kiddell instructions and their multiple logical statements for the jury to evaluate. Instead, why not directly place the burden of proving a lack of testamentary
capacity upon the opponent by rule of law? A simple direct statement placing the burden of proving incapacity upon those who allege it would return
Virginia law to Spencer (1798), where it began, as a rule of common law,
and from which it never should have deviated.

